Philosophy 100: Introduction to Philosophy Craig Fox

PAPER TOPICS, PAPER #1 (RUSSELL)

Due: Monday, 3/7/05

Length: about 5 pages

Choose ONE of the following topics. Any and all citations should be made only from Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy; provide page references in parentheses. (Do not appeal to any other sources—this is not a research paper.) Note that each topic contains a number of associated questions. Throughout the course of a good paper, most of these questions will probably be answered. The paper should not be, however, simply a listing of answers to these questions. Do not worry if your paper seems too specific, or if you spend a good deal of time belaboring small points: it is probably not possible to focus your paper too narrowly. Finally, remember that the goal is to explain Russell’s views—not your own. Assume that your reader is intelligent, yet ignorant of Russell’s philosophy. Be sure to label your paper with your topic number: 1, 2, or 3.

RECALL THE STRICT PENALTY FOR ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT.

(1) Idealism. Russell states that we ought not to be quick to dismiss idealism; indeed, we might describe it as an understandable reaction to certain epistemological facts (i.e. facts about the nature of our knowledge). Nevertheless, he clearly and explicitly rejects idealism. Explain what these facts are, according to Russell, as well as why idealism is unsatisfactory in his view.

-What are sense-data? -What are physical objects?

-What is matter? -What is physical space?

-What can we know about the nature of physical objects?

-What can we know—and not know—about physical space?

-What is idealism?

-How does our limited knowledge about physical objects (and physical space) suggest the possibility of idealism being correct?

-What is Russell’s criticism of (Berkeley’s version of) idealism?

[-Is Russell’s dismissal too quick? (Can you defend idealism?)]

Most relevant material will be found on pp. 7-45.

(2) Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Russell makes a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. What is this distinction, and what is the role that this distinction plays in Russell’s over-all epistemological theory (i.e. in Russell’s theory of what our knowledge is like)?

-What is Russell’s over-all theory? (E.g.: What are sense-data? What are physical objects? What can we know about physical objects and matter?)

-What does Russell mean by ‘acquaintance’?

-What does Russell mean by ‘description’?

-How does knowledge by description extend our over-all knowledge? (What kinds of things can or do we only know by description?)

-Which variety of knowledge is more “fundamental”?

-What is the “fundamental principle of analysis of propositions containing descriptions”?

[-Is there a plausible way to argue for or object to this “fundamental principle”?]

Most relevant material will be found on pp. 7-36 and pp. 46-59.

(3) Induction. In Chapter VI, Russell addresses the topic of induction, which he does because it allows us to expand what we call our knowledge. What is the inductive principle, how can it be justified, and how does it allow us to expand what we take ourselves to know (i.e., what is the role the inductive principle plays in Russell’s overall theory of what our knowledge is like)?

-How is the inductive principle necessary to explain what we take ourselves to know? (That is, what is the motivation for the discussion of induction?)

-What is the inductive principle? (Explain it in detail; give an example or two to help illustrate it. See pp. 66-67.)

-Why is the doubt “as to whether the laws of motion will remain in operation until tomorrow” an “interesting doubt?”

-Why is the fact that we simply do expect the future to be like the past not justification enough for our beliefs about the future?

-What kind of justification does Russell give for the inductive principle? Does he “prove it demonstratively?”

-Why is it that the inductive principle is neither capable of being proved by experience, nor disproved by experience? (Give an example or two to help illustrate the point here.)

[-Is there any flaw in Russell’s justification of the inductive principle? (Could or should a stronger justification be given?)]

Most relevant material will be found on pp. 60-69.