Remark 1. Consequentialist moral theories always judge the moral quality of an action — it's rightness or wrongness, its being permissible or obligatory — by the consequences of the action (and nothing else). One example of such a theory is ethical egoism, which judges the rightness of an action by its consequences for the agent. Another example is ethical altruism, which judges the rightness of an action by its consequences for everybody except the agent. In this article, Ross discusses two additional consequentialist theories. Hedonistic utilitarianism is the view that an action is morally right if, and only if, no other action would produce more pleasure (and less pain) in the world. Ideal (or pluralistic) utilitarianism is the view that an action is morally right if, and only if, no other action would produce more good (and less bad) in the world. (Here, "good" includes not only pleasure, but other desirable things like knowledge, certain personality traits, and so on.)

1. Ross thinks that all such consequentialist moral theories are wrong. How does he argue against ethical egoism? Does he use the method of paradigm example here?

2. How does Ross argue against hedonistic utilitarianism? Does he use the method of paradigm example?

3. How does Ross argue against ideal (or pluralistic) utilitarianism? Do any of his arguments use the method of paradigm example?

4. What is Ross's distinction between (a) an actual (or proper or absolute) duty, and a prima facie (or conditional) duty?

5. If Ross is not a consequentialist, what does he think determines the moral quality of an action?

6. How does Ross categorize prima facie or conditional duties?

Remark 2. An optimific act is one that produces at least as much good as any other. An act is bonific if it produces at least some good.