1.   Both Dworkin and Kymlicka contrast liberalism with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism was a highly popular theory from the late 19^th century until the late 60s. Crudely put, it holds that the goal of governments is to create the best possible life for the greatest number of people. The main criticism with this view is that it seems to allow for individual interests to be sacrificed in the name of the greater good. (If violating X’s rights will produce great social good then utilitarianism says it is okay to violate X’s rights.) Liberals want to provide a theory which allows the state to act to improve society without allowing for such violations of rights.

2.   Like Dworkin, Rawls starts with a presumption of equality for citizens and like Dworkin, he allows for deviations from this equality. What justifies moving away from equal shares?

3.   Unlike Dworkin, Rawls gives a detailed answer to the question of how are we to rank equality tradeoffs. He presents these as his two principles of justice and the corresponding priority rules. What are these? How do they work?

4.   What is attractive about equality of opportunity? Rawls does not reject the basic motivation behind equality of opportunity (in fact, he builds it into his own system). Where, then, does Rawls’ system conflict with equality of opportunity? Why does Rawls think that equality of opportunity should be abandoned?

5.   What is a social contract? There are two standard ways of looking at such a contract: actual and hypothetical. Critics are quick to point out the problems of such a system. What are they?

6.   There is a third way of conceiving of the social contract and that is as a thought experiment to demonstrate that citizens are morally equal. How does a social contract do this?

7.   Rawls introduces a twist to the idea of the original position in social contract theory. Why does he think that most social contract theorists have been unfair? His solution is the Veil of Ignorance. What is this and how does it work?

8.   Rawls thinks that anyone behind the Veil will end up choosing the difference principle (2^nd Principle of Justice – see q. 3). The next section tries to justify why that choice and no other is the rational choice to make.

9.   What are primary goods? Why does Rawls think that these are important for everyone? (That is, regardless of who is behind the Veil, why will they want to secure these goods?)

10.   People behind the Veil are supposed to act in their own interest and not be swayed be moral considerations. Nonetheless, Rawls thinks that they will end up choosing the very same society as someone who was motivated by morality. Why will this occur?

11.   Why does Rawls think that everyone will reject distributions based on utilitarian calculations? Or highly divided societies with great gaps between rich and poor? Or societies that discriminate against gays, minorities, women, religion, etc.? Note that this is supposed to work even for people who are rich, or do discriminate against gays. Why should even these people accept the difference principle?

12.   What is the ‘maximin’ strategy and how does it work?

13.   Just try to figure out what is going on. If things are too formal and abstract, don’t worry – we’ll discuss them in class.

1.   Rawls thinks that natural inequalities should be taken into account (much like Dworkin). Kymlicka, however, objects that Rawls’ system fails to compensate for undeserved natural inequalities (such as disabilities). Is there a way of defending Rawls here? (This is a tough question. Hint: The best avenue of attack seems to involve the two types of primary goods (social and natural) and showing how Rawls could compensate for the natural through the social.)

2.   Is the maximin strategy the one that would really be chosen behind the Veil? Suggest reasons why alternative strategies might be chosen (such as a riskier distribution or one that was more restrictive in its liberties to (currently) despised groups or one that introduced even greater equality at the cost of some freedoms). Either defend or criticize such a position.

3.   The ideal of public reason is one that is quite foreign to American politics. For instance, look at the highly partisan debates concerning abortion, gay rights, the role of women, pornography, etc. Here one often hears references to strongly held religious or philosophical beliefs. Under the public reason ideal, such foundational principles would be excluded from debate. Is this a good thing (as Rawls thinks) or does it rob people of the right to make important decisions based on their deepest convictions? Defend your view (and if appropriate, introduce credible counterviews).