

## Handout 7

### Review Outline

#### Realism and Idealism

- I. Three theories concerning sensible things and our knowledge of them: direct realism, indirect realism, and idealism.
- II. Berkeley's arguments against direct realism.
  - A. Arguments from pleasure or pain
  - B. The arguments from the variability of perception
- III. Berkeley's arguments against indirect realism
  - A. The problem of skepticism
- IV. Arguments against Berkeleyan idealism.
  - A. First objection: objects exist even when we do not perceive them.
  - B. Berkeley's reply to the first objection (and possible responses)
  - A. Second objection: Frege's objection.
  - B. Berkeley's replies to Frege's objection (and possible responses to Berkeley's replies)
- V. General assessment of the three theories: a tally of strengths and weaknesses

#### The Nature of Mind

- I. Two theories of mind: substance dualism, substance materialism
  - A. Substance dualism
    1. Arguments *for* substance dualism using Leibniz's Law; objections to these arguments
    2. Swineburne's two arguments for substance dualism
    2. Princess Elizabeth's argument *against* substance dualism
  - B. Substance materialism
    1. First argument for substance materialism: David Lewis
      - a. Lewis's method of defining mental states (and its predecessors: philosophical behaviorism and causal behaviorism)
      - b. Lewis's argument
      - c. Objections (and replies)
    2. Second argument for substance materialism: Donald Davidson

## The Nature of Substances (and Qualities)

- I. Introduction
  - A. Ontological categories, and some philosophical questions about them
  - B. A three-tiered method
  - C. Aristotle's criterion for distinguishing substances and qualities
  
- II. Qualities
  - A. First theory of qualities: qualities are concepts
    - 1. Objection
  - B. Second theory of qualities: qualities are universals
    - 1. Wolterstorff's objections (and possible replies)
  
- III. Substances
  - A. First theory of substance: substances are collections of qualities
    - 1. Objection: the bundle theory is incompatible with qualitative change.
    - 2. Objection: the case of the two spheres.
  - B. Second theory of substance: substances are bare particulars
    - 1. Objection: intelligibility
  - C. Third theory of substance: material substances are collections of their material parts
    - 1.. Objection: this theory is incompatible with mereological change
  - D. Fourth theory of substance: material substances are entities that are independent of mind, exist in space and time, and are capable of mereological change.
    - 1. Objection: two things in one place at the same time
    - 2. Carter's reply to this objection
    - 3. [Objection: intelligibility]
    - 4. [Objection: no suggestion here of a reduction of substance to other ontological categories]

## Personal Identity

- I. Criteria of application versus criteria of identity over time
- II. Locke's innovation: criteria of identity over time are different for different sortal concepts
- IV. Locke's identity criterion for parcels of matter (what he sometimes calls "bodies")
- V. Locke's identity criteria for plants, animals, "men".
- VI. Why we need identity criteria for persons.
- VII. The "same (human) body" criterion for personal identity

- A. Locke's objection: the prince and the cobbler
- B. Fission objection
- VIII. The "same soul" criterion for personal identity
  - B. Locke's objection
- IX. Locke's memory criterion for personal identity
  - A. First objection to Locke's memory criterion: Reid's objection
  - B. Reply to Reid's objection: revise the criterion using the relation of memory connectedness
  - C. Second objection to Locke's memory criterion: veridical *versus* false memories
  - D. Reply to the second objection: revise the criterion, employing the concept of *veridical* memories.
  - E. Problem of how to define the concept of a veridical memory.
    - 1. A definition that generates a (small) circle of definitions
    - 2. Another way to try to define veridical memory.

### Freedom of the Will

- I. Causal determinism
- II. An argument for incompatibilism (that if causal determinism is true, then we have no free will)
- III. Hard determinism
  - A. Objection to hard determinism: the costs of denying we have free will.
- IV. Simple indeterminism
  - A. Objection to simple indeterminism
- V. Soft determinism
  - A. The soft determinist's definitions of free action, free choice.
  - B. How paradigm examples support soft determinism

### God

- I. An ontological argument for the existence of God.
- II. Two cosmological arguments for the existence of God.
  - A. An argument with inconsistent premises.
  - B. An improved argument.