

Journal of Planning Education and Research

<http://jpe.sagepub.com/>

Planning and the Self-Organization of Marketplaces

Alfonso Morales

Journal of Planning Education and Research published online 14 October 2010

DOI: 10.1177/0739456X10386379

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://jpe.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/10/14/0739456X10386379>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:



[Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning](http://www.acsp.org)

Additional services and information for *Journal of Planning Education and Research* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://jpe.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://jpe.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Planning and the Self-Organization of Marketplaces

Journal of Planning Education and Research
XX(X) 1–16
© The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>
DOI: 10.1177/0739456X10386379
<http://jpe.sagepub.com>



Alfonso Morales¹

Abstract

The number of marketplaces in the United States is growing rapidly. This growth belies the long history of marketplaces and signals their reemergence as tools of planning practice. This article examines ways to plan marketplaces and how those strategies can help achieve various direct and indirect objectives of merchants, planners, and other professionals. The empirical case involves Chicago's Maxwell Street Market and how merchants in this large, ethnically heterogeneous public market self-organized the allocation of vending space. The article concludes with implications for public participation in public service provision, planning, and community economic development.

Keywords

citizen participation, community development, economic development, planning theory, governance, social services

An e-mail posted to a listserv on January 25, 2010:

Does anyone have experience with a vendor-run market—one with no set market manager in charge . . . ? Can this be done successfully?

Thank you.

Yes, it can. Consider the period between 1973 and 1994 when thousands of brown, black, and white street merchants swarmed around the area southwest of the Roosevelt/Halstead intersection, the Sears (now the Willis) Tower, and Chicago's downtown. Sunday after Sunday, outside and irrespective of weather, they crowded the perimeter of empty city blocks, parked where buildings once stood, and hustled to set up their small businesses. Occasionally they shouted greetings, supplied each other with coffee, visited about the week prior, chatted about their prospects for that day, and perhaps glared at an interloper seeking room for his or her truckload of merchandise. The rare shout, "Hey, that's someone's space!" sent the driver seeking room elsewhere; even rarer a menacing tone and body language told the trespasser he or she was not welcome in the vending space already allocated to someone else. With the intruder dispatched, the vendors returned to neighbors. With neither a policeman nor a city official in sight, how did as many as eleven hundred businesses coexist, Sunday after Sunday, with hardly a hitch?

Chicago's Maxwell Street Market (hereafter the Market) played such a dominant role in the late nineteenth century—socializing new immigrants, employing people, and generating economic activity—that Chicago, following the example of cities around the country, named and began governing the Market

in 1912. But the Market languished in the mid-twentieth century. Merchants then governed it for more than twenty years (1973-1994), when the city adopted a new management strategy, moving the Market and reorganizing it as part of the Department of Consumer Services to respond to the space needs of the University of Illinois and retail and housing redevelopment. But during period of self-governance the Market provided opportunities for social interaction, low-cost consumer goods, food security, entrepreneurship, entertainment, and more to twenty thousand people or more each Sunday (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). Before our eyes a version of M. L. King's beloved community unfolded—and versions of this vision are continuing to proliferate in farmers' markets, crafts markets, swap meets, and public markets around the country.¹

What the history of the Maxwell Street Market epitomizes is the trend of economic activity in markets generally. Until the twentieth century, most economic activity was self-organized, enabled by broad protections provided by the state. Thereafter, state regulation became prominent, and necessary, to provide infrastructure and to protect society from the vagaries of unconstrained business practices. Thus, economic governance shifted

Initial submission, April 2009; revised submissions, April and August 2010; final acceptance, September 2010

¹University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA

Corresponding Author:

Alfonso Morales, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 925 Bascom Mall, 104 Music Hall, Madison, WI 53706, USA
Email: morales1@wisc.edu



Figure 1. Busy every Sunday: Consumers and merchants



Figure 3. Dancing the blues away



Figure 2. The Chicago Blues born at Maxwell Street

largely from being a mostly private matter to one wherein the state took a firmer hand in regulating various elements of the economy and business. Yet people experimenting with new business models have been compelling new forms of governance, and planning theory, initially through participatory approaches, has long fostered an interest in inclusive governance activities (Arnstein 1969). So how can planners now incorporate this release of energy to achieve various planning objectives?

This article explores how self-governance might be an option for solving some planning problems, in this case the organization of marketplaces.² The article addresses these questions in three parts. The first part reviews literature in governance and participation. The second part deploys a pragmatist theory to make sense of how merchants organized vending space and connects the implications of that organization to various planning goals, like increasing public responsibility and fostering small business. The third part draws lessons for planning theory and professional practice from the example of merchant-organized vending space from the Maxwell Street Market.

Planning Theory and Governance

Broadly speaking, planning theory seeks ways to advance the common good. As Fainstein suggests, “Planning theory needs to consider under what conditions conscious human activity can produce a better city for all its citizens” (2005b, 121). For her, one version of what is better “may simply be restraint—not displacing ‘marginal’ uses for grandiose projects such as football stadiums and convention centers” (2005a, 16). For Healey, theory “has a continuing relevance to the challenge of thinking through how to realize the potential of the planning project for expanding the chances, in the flow of action, of more widespread opportunities for human flourishing in a more sustainable world” (2009, 288). This article indicates how a “marginal” use advances the common good and shows how planners might advance “widespread opportunities” by understanding the “flow of action” in that marginal use and, furthermore, how understanding that “flow” informs planners’ choice of governance strategies.

Traditional governance structures—for instance, centralized and representative government-supervising techno-bureaucratic organizations—useful in the twentieth century no longer have the same general effectiveness and legitimacy (Lobel 2007). Novel needs and changing conditions warrant experimentation with alternative strategies. By the 1980s, the debate on the welfare state’s provision of public services was obvious—and pronounced (Savas [1982] and Carnoy [1984] represent the debate). This blurring of public and private sectors in service provision moved regulation from government toward the affected groups and activities. Participation in governance varied a great deal, but managers mostly decided the roles played. Still, experimentation in governance was in full swing.

Stoker (1998) argues that the blurred boundaries between and within public and private sectors produce the conditions for a range of governance strategies. A variety of hybrid approaches spans the gap between top-down models driven by bureaucratic authority and bottom-up approaches integrating

participants in providing services in complex policy environments (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Casey 2009; Healey 1999). Planning theorists and other scholars have long identified the behavioral, social, or legal underpinnings of mixed or hybrid governance strategies (Jacobs 1961; Turner 1976; Ellickson 1991; Bovaird 2007; Morales forthcoming). The result is that we now have significant knowledge of hybrid approaches and understand their possibilities for and limitations in achieving public objectives.

Governance implies participation, which has long been a goal of planning practice (Forester 1989; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Healey 1999, 2009). Arnstein's original work on participation exemplifies governance options, suggesting "community control" (1969) as the highest rung on her ladder of participation. Communicative planning theory argues for governance options in achieving policy goals, and it develops approaches to promote creative interaction (Friedmann 1993; Casey 2009; Healey 2009). Still, supporters and critics are aware of the limitations of communicative planning. For instance, power relationships distort and eclipse shared activities and purposes (Hillier 1998; Sager 2006). Likewise, literature on privatization and alternative governance remarks on the extra burdens on people doing the work of government (Feigenbaum and Henig 1994; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Certainly the neoliberal critique should be reviewed for relevance to any particular situation (Harvey 2003). Yet these and other concerns should not distract us from empirical work to discover the creative approaches people develop in devising new governance strategies. In fact, careful research advances our knowledge of interaction and how we might harness situated interactions to advance planning objectives.

Interaction and Dimensions of Governance in Planning

Classic planning literature has taken situated activity and derived observations about different types of governance, from intrapersonal and interpersonal to modes of administrative practice. Planners have a lasting concern with street-level social life, how to support it, and how such interaction helps achieve public purposes. This literature differentiates organization from seemingly random or marginal activity and celebrates that activity for bridging individual and public purposes. Jacobs (1961) discerns the "bewildering number of components that go into [social] order" (p. 54) and shows how important human capacities emerge from interaction. She shows us how public responsibility emerges as people reflect on role models and everyday life: "People must take a modicum of public responsibility for each other. . . . This is a lesson nobody learns by being told. It is learned from the experience of having *other people without ties of kinship or close friendship or formal responsibility to you* take a modicum of public responsibility for you" (p. 82, her italics). For Jacobs, public responsibility is born of interaction, engenders reflection, and

produces a response that exemplifies reciprocal role-taking. Her examples show how otherwise unacquainted people respond to each other in need. She sees city neighborhoods as "organs of self-government" and considers "our failures . . . failures in localized self-government . . . our successes [likewise]" (p. 114). She argues that important ideas, like public responsibility, come from interactions that "grow networks of small-scale, everyday public life" (p. 119). Through role-taking, people learn public responsibility and identify similar interests that enable them to "form relationships with people whose roots and backgrounds are in entirely different constituencies" (p. 134). From these come capacities important for fuller participation in social and political parts of city life.

Jacobs's observations stimulated thinking about how planning might advance these personal and public objectives. Richard Sennett (1971) argues that modern urban communities should promote maturity and responsibility. Maturity is akin to "public responsibility," or "self-government." The maturing person is learning to "tolerate painful ambiguity and uncertainty" (p. 108) and "to get involved . . . in messy, disorganized social experiences" (p. 131), thus engaging "the human 'otherness'" (p. 132) around him or her. Sennett calls for government to "remove from massive bureaucracies the power to regulate conflict" because conflict and "messy" activities would enable humans to do things for themselves (p. 165). What a novel role for government! A decade prior to the governance debates, Sennett advocates creating disorder, not a high government priority. For Sennett, bureaucrats should permit the *disorganization* of some city services because doing so encourages interaction, fosters human development, and improves the service through experimentation.³ Like Jacobs, Sennett implies role-taking, reciprocal orientations, and ongoing interaction will resolve the conflict and ambiguity that inevitably emerge.

Sennett foreshadowed new modes of governance and Frug (1999) follows the same course, developing the theory and providing empirical examples of cities promoting community by emphasizing the "public" side of public service when cooperating with citizens in service provision. Like Jacobs and Sennett, he sees a seamless integration of personal and public purposes, suggesting that cooperation and citizen self-provision of some services will stimulate personal growth, increase "fun" in the community, and improve the quality of the services provided.⁴ He claims that citizen involvement in service provision will build community by increasing interpersonal trust and promoting interactions that render unfamiliar people more familiar. In short, Frug contends that city services should become vehicles to build community by helping people recognize their mutual interests—across boundaries of ethnicity, race, or gender.

In summary, Jacobs, Sennett, and Frug deploy planning-related examples to show how interaction establishes and diffuses multiple governance modes that encourage personal growth, humane cities, and effective services.⁵ Interaction is at the core of their arguments, but planning has not adopted a theory of interaction; nor do we often use research methods

that advance our knowledge of the situated interactions that produce self-governance and common goods. Pragmatism provides both.

Theorizing Interaction

From the pragmatist G. H. Mead we get the conceptual tools for understanding interaction in situated practices (Healey 2009; Hoch 2007). Mead's work is not well known to planners, but his approach comprehends interaction generally and has application anywhere interaction, or the "flow of action," is studied. Pragmatists see human action as creative, and they locate creativity in situated interaction (Healey 2009; Hoch 2007). Any interaction is of interest, but problem situations are central to understanding creativity and interaction. When examining a problem, we identify social organization, individual perspectives on organization, and distinct interests (Morales 1998, 2003).

Pragmatists explain behavior and meaning as products of active processes involving a number of agents, not isolated individuals. Participants learn the concepts common to particular practices. Their experience is pluralistic and changes with time and context. Though language and usage may differ from person to person, shared purposes resolve ambiguity. Organizational forms are established and stabilized by shared purposes, making them recognizable and learnable. But forms can also be multiple and flexible, responsive as they are to circumstances and purposes. In short, pragmatists focus on interaction, seeking to understand the reciprocal processes associated with imputing meaning to behavior in particular contexts.

At the heart of Mead's approach to interaction is the concept of taking the role of the other. Mead assumes a process model of social life in which society, selves, cognition, and so forth are studied using the concept of a "social act," which involves two or more individuals. Mead's work provides us with the conceptual apparatus for understanding the interactions described by Jacobs, for relating interaction to the goals of maturity and incorporating the public into service provision as espoused by Sennett and Frug, for understanding the complex street-level interaction found at the Market, for relating that interaction to planning theory and objectives, and finally for deriving implications for planning practice from both theory and the setting. Mead's work is particularly salient because it explains how people learn from interacting with each other and how people relate to each other in organizing some activity. Thus, Mead's theory shows how interaction produces common goods, like public responsibility, or public services, such as the organization of vending space. This discussion includes two key elements of the theory—the social act and taking the role of the other.

The Social Act

The social act comes in four phases: impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. Impulses initiate act(s). In

consummation, impulses are expressed or frustrated, and outcomes are evaluated as (un)successful, good, bad, neutral, and so forth. Coming between impulse and consummation, perception and manipulation warrant fuller discussion because they are the variable stages that most affect the final outcome. Perception, the process of scanning the environment for what is needed to consummate an impulse, can be at some distance from the immediate objective and can be similarly organized by different people with similar objectives. This scanning process involves imagination as someone conceives how others might respond to some action. In the course of manipulation, actors discover the utility of their action and the responses of others. Consider the example of people joining others at a park. As they search for a place to "pitch a tent," they delay consummation as they consider the activities of others, potential resistance to their choice of a place, their need to be visible to friends, their desire for an aesthetically pleasing place, or other goals they might have. These reflections may be at some physical and sociotemporal distance from other people, and each reflection they have constitutes an alternative line of action. All members of the picnic party reflect on this process, act on it, and communicate about it. Each person's interaction produces choices, choices that constitute, intensify, or expand the "enduring fabric as a basis for alternative courses of action" (Mead 1938, 191-92). As implied in the above, a person's choice of how to participate in activities at the park relies on taking the role of the other.

Taking the Role of the Other

I have applied Mead's concept of role expectations to marketplaces and his concept of role-taking to how people become marketplace entrepreneurs; this discussion draws from those (see Morales 2009a, 2009c). Situated practices are built from participants' adjusting their responses to each other within an ongoing social process. Effortless or ordinary adjustments produce effortless (even if complex) situations. But when an impulse is blocked, situations become problematic and individuals perceive their options from the perspective of the role they are playing. They take on the roles of others, view themselves as objects from the standpoints of others, and consider alternative lines of action (Mead 1977).

Generally, a blocked impulse compels some emotion; the impulse becomes an image or images; and each image implies a course of action, inclusive of others' reactions to the plan. A subsequent impulse transforms the plan to action, combines the plan with another plan, or blocks the plan. This process continues until the impulse is consummated or the social act diminishes. The consummation stage does not imply some normative judgment about the resolution but only that the practical problem is solved and social action resumes. Which role will be invoked in each particular situation? The answer is simple: the role that is most relevant and that offers the best chance of solving the problem. If one approach fails, another

in the same role might be tried, another role will be invoked, or perhaps the effort will be abandoned.

According to Mead, we try roles and distinct courses of action to develop a sense of their behavioral implications. We begin to learn the language, ideas, and behaviors associated with roles, and we begin to recognize alternative practices of a role. Our response to a situation can be creative or imaginative as we try the alternative ideas/behaviors associated with a role. Though we cannot always predict how someone will proceed in resolving a situation, we do know that shared purposes and reciprocal orientations will help reconcile differences. Once resolved parties see the reconstructed situation, their role in that reconstruction, and the personal implications of that reconstruction, new selves emerge from the old: "Solution is reached by the construction of a new world harmonizing the conflicting interests into which enters the new self" (Mead 1964, 149).

In summary, Mead's conceptual apparatus, role-taking, and interaction are central to theorizing about social organization and how vendors governed space allocation at the Market. People who take on the role of vendor learn to accept responsibilities associated with that role. Accepting a role compels one to interpret and practice it to permit ongoing interaction. But as we will see, role acceptance does not imply role consistency. Nor does accepting a role mean the absence of conflict. Rather, the capacity for role-taking produces reciprocal orientations and helps adjust interaction. Over time, shared meaning accumulates that serves existing and emergent purposes and creates habits and expectations. But none of this is unchanging. New problems and opportunities are the conditions for new usages and modifications of roles, purposes, and habitual ideas-in-practice.

Thus, as we consider people becoming vendors at a market, we expect them to learn to adjust their behavior according to circumstances.⁶ If the market is organized by the state, they will adjust to that regulatory regime; if organized by merchants, likewise; if some combination of the two, they will incorporate the associated expectations into their habitual behavior. Each type of governance, state-centered, mixed, or self-governed, contextualizes distinct interactions. These interactions create distinct roles, opportunities for learning, and expectations about others. In short, distinct governance strategies will fulfill different planning goals in different ways. Each jurisdiction's governance strategy will have implications for the practice of roles, the goals selected, and the manner in which public objectives are advanced.

Sociohistorical Context, Regulatory Regimes, and Research Methods

The history of Chicago's Maxwell Street Market exemplifies movement between distinct governance strategies and reveals some of the conditions for self-governance. Organized in various ways, marketplaces have fulfilled civic and economic purposes for centuries (Tangires 2003; Pirenne 1925). Maxwell

Street has served Chicagoland for more than one hundred years (Eastwood 1991; Morales 2000; Eshel and Schatz 2004; Berkow 1977). The novelist Willard Motley conveys life at the Market:

Nick turned onto Maxwell Street. Before him stretched the Maxwell Street Market. . . . On the sidewalks were long rows of stands set one next to the other as far as he could see. On the stands were dumped anything you wanted to buy: overalls, dresses, trinkets, old clocks, ties, gloves—anything. . . . There were still other rough stands—just planks set up across loose-jointed wooden horses: hats for a quarter apiece, vegetables, curtains, pyramid-piled stacks of shoes tied together by their laces—everything. (1947, 91)

and

This is Maxwell and Halsted. The neighborhood awakens. People come out on the street. A parade of hunched shoulders, hard faces, battered felts, baggy pants, ragged coats. . . . Maxwell Street is a small hub around which a little world revolves. This is Jerusalem. The journey to Africa is only one block. It is one block from Africa to Mexico, from Mexico to Italy two blocks, from Italy to Greece three blocks. (1958, 84)

The diversity in the Market is palpable, as are the poverty and the makeshift nature of business. But superficial observations belie the energy within, as businesses large and small grow in markets. From the 1870s, vendors worked every day, but by the 1960s, most merchants were there Sunday only, with as many as eleven hundred merchants returning week after week.⁷ The significant economic activity generated by markets like the Maxwell Street one attracted the attention of policy makers in the early twentieth century (Sullivan 1913; Morales 2000).

Initially, Maxwell Street merchants organized themselves, prowling streets and sidewalks around the south and west sides. But in 1912, the city established a planning body to investigate the role markets might play in Chicago. That body presented two reports to the City Council, which then, foreshadowing policy choices today, decided to recognize the Market and use it as a policy tool to improve access to food, incorporate immigrants, and relieve unemployment (Morales 2000). Central to city regulation was the mayor-appointed market master, who controlled the allocation of vending space. Over the next sixty years, market masters were accused of favoritism and corruption, especially for extracting surplus rents from merchants. For instance, in 1926, newspapers reported that Alderman Fick (20th ward) was "squabbling" with vendors and that the money extorted from vendors was estimated at \$250,000 per year (Berkow 1977, 128). Despite an alliance of aldermen, vending continued.

Economic changes marginalized the Market in the middle of the twentieth century. As immigrants assimilated into Chicago's economy, different immigrants replaced them. Between 1900 and the 1950s, the Jews (who had replaced the Irish in the Market) had won some economic mobility and were diffusing to other neighborhoods (Eastwood 2002; Eshel and Schatz 2004). African Americans began to replace them and were slowly supplemented by Mexican Americans. This demographic process was not without ethnic strife. In 1938, Jewish leaders charged that the Market produced "seeds of anti-Jewish feeling," and they sought its eradication (Berkow 1977, 210). Yet nothing came of this effort to abolish the Market. In 1957, the construction of the Dan Ryan Expressway threatened one side of the Market. Though construction demolished the Jefferson Street portion of the Market, merchants simply moved three blocks west (Eastwood 2002; Morales 1993). Despite a declining housing stock and resident out-migration, the Market remained a magnet for consumers and an important source of income for merchants. Regardless of actual land tenure, market masters went on allocating vending space on the street or sidewalk, and vendors slowly began parking on newly available vacant lots in the area.

The decisive change in Market governance occurred in 1975 when charges of corruption again plagued the Market and the market master of twenty-five years died and went unreplaced. In late 1975, the city amended the Market ordinance, removing mention of a market master and requiring merchants to do two things: occupy a five-by-nine-foot space and pay an annual license fee. When (and if) they obtained a license, merchants were told that vending space was allocated on a "first-come, first-served" basis. The new ordinance ignored merchants' needs for differently sized vending spaces and chaos enveloped the Market. Merchants swiftly moved to establish a stable and flexible organization of vending space, going from "manipulated" to "in control" overnight (Arnstein 1969). The city, likely embarrassed by decades of corruption and struggle with vendors, ignored the Market. Merchants developed and practiced their self-governance strategies. Unwittingly, the city had brought into being Sennett's (1971) "disorganized" public service.

In this case, the conditions for self-governance developed from government neglect of the Market combined with the shared purposes of merchants and the ongoing interests of consumers. For twenty years, merchants successfully self-organized vending space, but the Market fell victim to the growing needs of the University of Illinois at Chicago. The unorganized merchants, unable to establish political allies, were displaced by a complex planning process that started with a "Community Assistance Panel" in 1989 (Morales 1993; Walker 2000) and ended with the city reasserting control over the Market.⁸ This brief history reveals three distinct regimes characterizing the access and allocation of vending space: the first, 1912 to 1973, was dominated by authoritarian market masters; the second, 1973 to 1994, by vendor self-governance; the third, 1994 onward, by reascent city

regulation (for details on governance, see Martel 1996; Walker 2000; Morales 2006).

Research Methods

This article focuses on merchants' governance of the Market during the middle regime. I employed multiple methods of investigation: archival analysis, ethnographic and participant observation, and structured interviews (Gaber and Gaber 1997). Archival and interview research were suited for learning about the early history of the Market and the transition back to city regulation, but only participant observation revealed how merchants organized themselves. Hence, I observed and interacted with vendors for more than three years, starting in March 1989 and ending in July 1992. I became a vendor to establish rapport and to learn to reason as merchants reasoned about business, including how they allocated vending space. I attended the Market most Sundays for a period of forty-one months: March 1989 through July 1992. During this time, I spent twenty contiguous months vending. I vended for eighty-three of those eighty-six Sundays. My observations indicated seasonal variation in vending with as many as 1,100 businesses employing approximately three thousand people between April and October decreasing to about 350 businesses with about eight hundred employees in January and February.⁹ In addition, I interviewed members of fifty-six households in an attempt to represent variation in length of time vending (four vending households with thirty or more years of experience, eight with less than three years, the rest in between) and in vendor ethnicity, gender, and age; and to identify household composition, type of items sold, and net sales.¹⁰ Of the households interviewed, nineteen were Latino (mostly Mexican American), twenty-four were black, eleven were white, and two were Asian.

As for its physical environment, the Market was outdoors without permanent stalls (see Figure 4). Merchants arrived, set up, and departed the same day. Here, I report on how vendors acquired and organized vending space and on variations in self-governance across the Market. The system was born of two modes of governance: firm-likeness and embeddedness. These variables are continuous but can be constrained to low or high values. Firm-likeness means some combination of three things: (1) renting or purchasing a space, (2) space-marking practices, and (3) having or developing a propensity for contract-like relationships. The highest level of firm-likeness indicates that all three are present. Embeddedness means either (1) that the vendor has integrated many household members into business, (2) that the vendor(s) relate to neighboring vendors to help secure stable space, or (3) some combination of the first two. High embeddedness means, for instance, that neighboring merchants are "good friends" and that many family members, often living in different households, cooperate in preserving the space.

Interviews, observations, and experience were the means to estimate the percentage of merchants practicing each mode. High levels of firm-likeness, as in purchase and rental of space



Figure 4. Space marking on a Saturday

or deployment of space marking, organized about 30 percent of the market. High levels of embeddedness organized about 60 percent of the Market. “Garage sale guys” (GSG) vended on the periphery and were some 10 percent of the Market. We might expect the most secure tenure where both firm-likeness and intervendedor relationships are “high.” However, this was not the case; being high in one or the other was sufficient for securing tenure. This implies that planners should attend carefully to different degrees and practices organizing both modes. In this case, my research has found that, just as a diversity of uses contributes to lively neighborhoods, variation in both modes creates a lattice-like organization that is both stable and flexible.

Access and Allocation of Vending Space, 1973-1994¹¹

For sixty years, mayor-appointed market masters were capricious and corrupt centralized authorities. Each was a “Leviathan” who authored order and arbitrated disputes; the police enforced his decisions, and vendors did what they were told and paid the fees demanded. In terms of governance, the market master *manipulated* merchants (Arnstein 1969), reduced their *responsibility* (Jacobs 1961) to fee-paying allegiance, *marginalized and infantilized* their interaction and relationships (Turner 1976; Sennett 1971), and *incapacitated* them by freezing them out of decision-making processes (Frug 1999). Few in the planning literature would find much to appreciate in the market master’s regime. After his demise, the lucrative income earned at the Market compelled the increasingly heterogeneous vending population to develop a system of space allocation. How did the merchants respond to the changed situation?

Changing Role Expectations

An African American merchant, Louis, illuminates the changing salience of the merchant’s role and the two modes in the

new system of self-governance resulting from the amended ordinance:

Well, when [the city] made the move from market master to license, that was a very uncomfortable time. For the next five or six years, there were problems with spaces. People had to block their territory and save it some kind of way, and people did it all sorts of ways. On our corner it was done; I don’t know—you could say it’s a combination of fear and charisma. People knew we were about business and that we were down there all the time. . . . So we come early, clean up, and protect our space. I guess it’s mutual respect among legit vendors.

Louis emphasizes that there are new expectations associated with the change to self-governance and that multiple modes might effectively consummate that role, but for him, being “about business” (firm-likeness), combined with charisma and respect (embeddedness), did the job. Note the implied interaction between people “knowing” his family was “about business.” It will be in such interaction that we will look for other dimensions and practices of firm-likeness and embeddedness. Furthermore, by examining interaction, we uncover the roots of self-governance in this context, discover how “blocked impulses” produce conflict, and learn how vendors resolve and mitigate such conflict.

The complex, multiauthored governance system that merchants orchestrated responded to the unrealistic expectations introduced by the city. Lupe and Felix Barela identify problems with the “first-come, first-served” expectation:

Are you kidding? We’re the only ones here that early (typically 3 to 4 a.m.)! Besides, what if you come earlier than me? Then if I don’t move you, well, I’ll just come earlier next week, and you won’t beat me. I’ll come Saturday afternoon if I have to. This is our space!¹²

The five Barela family members secured space for four distinct businesses (see Figure 5). Willing to confront trespassers, they illustrate how merchants develop a psychological tie and readiness to defend their space. Chicago Police, when they could be found at the Market, could be no more than a symbolic presence—they could not adjudicate between competing claims, nor did they try.

In short, despite an unrealistic and unenforced ordinance, merchants self-created a system of governance suited to their needs and resources. This bottom-up system is best captured by two characteristics, firm-likeness and embeddedness.

Bottom-Up Governance

The system the merchants practiced should be examined closely for how it operated, the goals it fulfilled, the costs it created, and the lessons it has for planning practice and theory.



Figure 5. A Barela family business

Merchants in embedded relationships were friendly with each other and supported each other's claim to space. These are horizontal relationships a practicing planner would recognize when observing a market. Planners would recognize firm-likeness through the business ideas used, such as renting tables to signal tenure in a space. Some merchants were high on both dimensions, obtaining fictive title to a space, marking it, and having strong relationships with neighbors. How did vendors initially acquire vending space? Some continued with the space they were allocated during the market master's regime. Yet all vendors supplanted the market master's guarantee with firm-likeness and embeddedness, as they deemed appropriate.

However, most merchants were not part of the prior regime, and all augmented the business elements of the role "vendor" with participation in space allocation. In the first examples that follow (Tina Marie, Mondragon brothers, Louis), I show how vendors established and practiced firm-likeness; in the succeeding discussion (Virgilee), I relate different forms of embeddedness and the relationships characteristic of that mode; and in the third example (Pancho), I detail the experience of a merchant whose practices employ both modes. Tina Marie is a highly educated woman who described herself as "Italian-American"; her path to vending is chronicled elsewhere (Morales 2009a). Hers was a firm-like approach to vending space in that a large fruit and vegetable seller, Johnny, owned the space she rented. Other vendors also rented some space from Johnny. When Tina purchased her spice business from previous vendors, she also purchased the right to vend in the space. Her monthly rental fee was in addition to the business purchase price, and the only service she seemed to get was snow shoveling in the winter. Each vendor Johnny rented space to engaged in a separate bilateral arrangement: paperless contracts between themselves and Johnny (Macaulay 1963). Tina Marie's space was not physically marked, but the participants knew her location as well as other vendors' locations.

I asked her one time, "How is space structured at this corner?" Tina Marie found some paper and began to draw, noting the following:



Figure 6. Tina Marie's spice van next to a soap vendor

Johnny owns this building and this is his fruit. I rent from him. Tony usually sets up next to me, but he is subletting to someone else until he gets back from Florida, but Tony rents from Johnny also. Art is next to Tony; he sells all the grocery store stuff. His space is rented some from Johnny and some from Chuck. Chuck owns the fenced-in property, and Art needs it to pull in the big trucks. But Chuck works mainly with Johnny.

The vendors of all these different businesses—spices, next to soaps, next to T-shirts and other sundries, next to newly expired items from grocery stores—rented space from Johnny (or Chuck) who owned the land (see Figure 6). All the above transactions were in cash with no receipts exchanged. People relied on the "title" provided by cash-created contracts.

Other vendors also practiced firm-like approaches to vending space by purchasing fictive title to a space, like the Mondragon brothers, who bought twenty linear feet of broken-up sidewalk for \$1,000, a transaction I witnessed and recorded (Morales 1993). No legal title changed hands, but legal-like expectations stabilized the relationships between buyer and seller and signaled to neighboring vendors the legitimacy of the new occupants. Vendors purchasing space consummated their impulse to vend by assuming the role and demonstrating to other merchants that they were "about business."

To increase firm-likeness, merchants invested in space-marking devices. Highly firm-like vendors might have rented their space and also display tables from another vendor whose hired help deployed tables in the wee hours of Sunday mornings.¹³ The table renter never rented unless he was confident about the claim to space. Rented tables only marked space for some one hundred vendors. Other vendors stretched chains or planks between milk crates or spray-painted the street, but these devices did not guarantee space. Still other vendors oriented themselves on these devices. Yet new merchants acting on city expectations occasionally intruded on the system they did not understand. Louis's family rented some tables, and his brother Derek's experience exemplifies the problem:

Once when I came to work on a Sunday, about four in the morning, there was a Korean in my spot and I told him he had to move, and he was trying to say that he had been there first. Here I've been coming for ten years, you know, year in and year out, and then because someone went downtown to get a license and the city told him he could set up wherever he wanted, that made me feel really bad. So after he didn't move, I ended up just physically—just grabbing him and just tossing him into the street—and I felt bad because I didn't really want to hurt anybody. I apologized and I ended up sharing the corner with him that Sunday, and then the following week we shared it again. But I told him, "You know you need to go and find yourself another spot because I have stuff that I didn't take out of the truck because I let you work here today." So he understood and he moved on.

Such conflicts born of competing impulses were few and far between, even in the collective memory of all the merchants I interviewed. This was largely because most potential vendors took the role of the existing vendor and understood the purpose of space-marking devices—only the most naïve did otherwise. Yet occasionally "messy" experiences were resolved as people learned the system. The merchants relying on firm-likeness depended on space-marking devices or the protection from an "owner" who rented vending space. Either firm-like approach engaged the imagination of potential interlopers sufficiently to avoid most conflict. Despite Derek's experience, the former worked reliably; as to the latter, consider Tina Marie's and other vendors' creative integration of legal expectations and experiences transported to the Market. Despite the success of firm-likeness, most merchants acquired vending space through relationships. This practice of embeddedness is our second mode of space allocation.

Embeddedness comes in many forms. Ace, for instance, was given his space by merchants he worked for as a youth. Virgilee became friendly with merchants who provided her some space. The Barela family, discussed above, incorporated children into the business, and then created businesses for their children, and with each new business the family members slowly stretched their relationships with neighboring vendors into more space for their businesses. I reestablished my business five times in different parts of the Market, each time developing relationships with neighbors to secure a vending space. Common to these various forms were a friendliness among vendors, a shared sense of purpose, and a willingness to engage each other on an even footing, with each participant believing the others would also cooperate in matters of vending space, but in the name of friendship. This more "social" interaction along with an ongoing diffuse form of reciprocity is in contrast to a reciprocity embodied in the exchange of cash and the business-like interaction that characterizes firm-likeness in space acquisition, although vendors using either method successfully acquired space and satisfied their impulse to vend.

Reciprocal orientations anchored in social relationships instead of business-like agreements signal embeddedness. Merchants had fun at the Market; they purchased coffee or food for each other, shared stories and jokes, and otherwise helped each other pass monotonous hours. Alternating who would arrive early in the morning, one merchant would glare, bristle, or perhaps make threatening moves toward some potential interloper. The person desiring to vend would have to consider these signals when deciding whether to put the "first-come" advice to the test. For instance, Virgilee, a black woman in her middle forties, vended between black and white vendors, but she was never asked to take a turn showing up early to protect the vending space. Ben, one of her neighbors, put it bluntly: "Oh, she could probably keep the spaces, but some people are stubborn and act belligerent, and I won't put up with that; but Virgilee, she's nice to have because she's friendly and brings the customers around, she's always smiling, and we like her." I tested both sides of these relationships—as the interloper, finding vendors vigorously defending their neighbor's space as well as their own, and as the neighboring vendor, expected to play a role in preserving space. Any person determined to vend would not soon give up, but he or she would have to stop, think, and formulate a new approach.

Thus, vendors developed new habits and expectations associated with embeddedness. Small-scale rituals of social life—shared coffee, casual conversation, turn-taking in securing space, habitual belligerence in the face of an interloper—all had a place in realizing an already-established vendor's impulses and blocking those associated with aspiring merchants. Being neighbors for months, then years at a time, cemented these relationships and associated expectations and, taken together with firm-likeness, produced a service that had both individual and collective benefits. Merchants learned responsibility to each other, communicated expectations across their differences and demonstrated a maturity born of accepting the interpersonal consequences of their role as they practiced it. In vending many merchants reaped significant economic rewards, but they also had fun and helped create one of Chicago's most famous experiences. We can see how diffuse but real reciprocal obligations develop and how neighbors support each other in different ways. Reciprocal orientations are developed in role-taking, but the specific outcomes varied by the mode, firm-likeness or embeddedness, that the particular merchants practiced. Now, through an extended example, I will demonstrate how Pancho became a merchant, embedded himself in the Market and also came to practice firm-likeness in his approach to vending space.

Learning to Be Legit

I met Pancho while he was selling belts as a GSG. His success increased his desire for space with more customers passing by. Anxious, he tried arriving early in the morning, parking behind a vacant plywood table, and laying out his belts, but trouble ensued: "I thought they were abandoned stands, but when the

owner appeared, I had to move.” Other times he approached vendors, but they vigorously defended spaces, shooing him away; however, these “messy” experiences helped Pancho realize that becoming a vendor meant learning the way space was allocated. He continued as a GSG and cultivated relationships with vendors. As he became committed to vending, he experienced a role transformation, seeing himself as a businessman instead of a warehouse worker.

Pancho learned that the city required a license, but he discovered that many vendors went without—the city rarely checked. Furthermore, he learned that the city promulgated a “first-come, first-served” approach to vending space, yet he had already discovered that this approach was not operative. As he learned from merchants about their space practices, he sheepishly admitted his embarrassment at trying to occupy “empty” spaces, “I would want someone to respect me if it were my space.” Pancho got to know merchants, white, black, and brown. He even sold them a few belts when they were least busy, early in the morning or late in the day. He learned about the reciprocal relationships and obligations neighbors had related to space. His mental map became nuanced; where he once saw ambiguity, he now discerned a multimodal order.

Vending was some merchants’ primary source of income, but all merchants had other responsibilities that occasionally required they be absent from the Market. Thus, there was the need for occasional substitutes and even permanent replacements. Pancho’s entrée was as a substitute; in his course of learning about the system, merchants learned about him. One asked him to take his space while he was on vacation. Merchants occupied as few as 5 linear feet of space (a key cutter) or as much as 80 to 120 feet (auto parts, furniture). Becoming a reliable substitute marked Pancho as firm-like and established him as friendly, reliable, and “about business.”

When Pancho heard a merchant was forsaking his space, he inquired about becoming the new occupant. The two were casually acquainted, and Fulano thought Pancho would be a reliable replacement. Fulano was very friendly with five other merchants, two black, two Mexican, and one white, and their interpersonal relationships signaled a high level of embeddedness. So when Pancho took over Fulano’s space, his new neighbors acknowledged him but did not accept him:

In the beginning my new neighbors would say, “That is Fulano’s space.” Everyone would tell me that. So I talked to Fulano and he told me, “You don’t have problems with me; I have something else to do on Sundays.” Then Fulano told the neighbors and that is how it became mine.

Fulano was embedded with his neighbors: his neighbors, not fully convinced he had quit vending, thought of Pancho in his recognized role of substitute. Pancho’s new neighbors anticipated Fulano’s possible return, but they also accepted Pancho.

After Fulano notified his old neighbors, Pancho expected and found changes in his neighbors. Pancho said, “After Fulano’s words, I was better accepted. My neighbors really talked with me, they told me when it was my turn to come early, they bought me coffee, we talked about our families, they became my friends.” Pancho’s example demonstrates how embedded relationships secure space and even evolve into friendships. In Pancho’s case and in many others, relationships often crossed ethnic divides.¹⁴ Vendors entertained customers and each other with the broken Spanish spoken by blacks or some street idiom voiced by whites or Mexicans. Such relationships and behavior helped make the Market vibrant and accommodating. More important, such relationships evinced the interactions at the heart of social acts that compose the system of self-governance.

Still, even if the vending space arrangements are working, vendors might adopt the mode they are not practicing. Let us follow Pancho’s path as he describes how he came to deepen his firm-like behavior regarding space:

In the first months that I sold, I brought my own table. Then the neighbor [Prieto] noticed how I carried my table and he said, “Contact Jimerson. He’ll put a table for you and charge you five dollars, and then you’ll have your space.”

Contrary to this confidence communicated by Prieto’s remark, rental from Jimerson did not guarantee a space. A rented table is a marker, but as Derek’s experience with the Korean showed, table rental is a precarious claim to space. Prieto was already renting two tables from Mr. Jimerson. I asked Prieto why he suggested this option to Pancho, to which he responded, “Well, it’s clear, man. That way he don’t have to carry a table, and then people see a table there and they won’t take the space.” Prieto was part of the embedded group of vendors Pancho joined, and three of the four in the group rented tables; the fourth did not as he used his pick-up to carry both merchandise and display tables. These vendors felt that their individual spaces were more secure, and they mentioned enjoying some labor-saving benefit from the arrangement (see Figure 7). The commitment of five dollars per week illustrated firm-like behavior to stabilize property relations further.

I asked Pancho about the new arrangement:

This other way you bring your table, and then someone tries to take your space. So now I pay and Mr. Jimerson sets up my table. But it was my neighbor who told me to contact him. It’s only five bucks for the whole day. The other people talking to me is what did it.

Pancho felt more secure in this new arrangement. But he emphasized the social source of the arrangement. He knew that the table rental represented a business-like move, but the additional security signaled by a rented table was based on



Figure 7. Pancho and his belts

the relational trust that developed when the idea worked and was appreciated.

In sum, though not needed to secure a vending space, some merchants became both firm-like and embedded, compelled in part by the nature of their relationships with their neighbors. Still, what these examples demonstrate is the stable yet supple governance of space that merchants developed following the demise of the market master. Vendors confronted the messy, disorganized Market needing to interact with “others.” Their interactions and responses to the new ordinance produced firm-like and embedded modes of space allocation. Merchants secured space through one or both of these modes according to their circumstances and needs. In short, in this case, merchants replaced the city in allocating the Market’s vending space by developing a flexible and stable system responsive to various circumstances.

The governance system merchants developed stabilized tenure for all except GSG. There was variability in the system, demonstrating the variation one can expect in systems of self-governance. The variation is not idiosyncratic; rather, it is responsive to vendors’ circumstances, and the examples indicate how tenure is secured in a variety of ways. If a merchant was highly firm-like or highly embedded, then he or she enjoyed tenure as secure as that enjoyed by merchants with high levels of both. Merchants had lives that required adaptability to seasonal changes, vacations, emergencies, and other vagaries. That flexibility was supplied by the constant demand for vending space by potential merchants who were willing to adopt and learn practices associated with the role.

Discussion

Occasionally, the planning literature points out the limits of self-governance. Umemoto and Suryanata (2006) warn that ethnically heterogeneous settings might not be amenable to self-governance; this analysis indicates otherwise by showing how street vendors successfully self-governed a public service.

Mead’s social psychology theorizes the interpersonal interactions at the heart of the system. The resulting cooperation produced what I would call a multimodal or polycentric system of self-governance (Ostrom 2008).¹⁵ This research recalls an ongoing emphasis in the planning literature on the various roles that (self-) governance and public participation play in urban life. Over the past fifty years, planning theorists have anticipated the need for new modes of participation and new forms of governance based on demographic changes and changes in the role of government. Jacobs, Sennett, Frug, and others have observed and demanded opportunities for interaction that would capacitate the public and appropriately incorporate them in service provision. Clearly, not all public services should be self-provided. However, it is equally clear that many activities can be self-provided, contingent on context and objectives.

The merchants’ creation of self-governance achieves planning objectives without planners or other bureaucrats. Street-level relationships are established and enhanced. People mature, take responsibility for each other, and realize other interpersonal benefits while developing human capital skills related to business and improving their economic status. While the benefits to merchants may be uneven (Morales 2009c), they are important. In short, this analysis demonstrates how people can self-provide a service in a complex social environment. Paradoxically, this analysis opens the doors for planning and for new planning practices if we turn our attention to governance.

There are a few direct implications for practice. First, the number of marketplaces is growing rapidly, and planners should create the conditions for self-governance should that fit their overall objectives. They can do so by communicating to merchants their expectations and reasons for self-governance—among the ideas, that the merchants have some flexibility in fulfilling their other roles, that self-governance makes room for seasonal or other fluctuations in business, and that the costs saved can be devoted to improving the market in other ways. Perhaps resources can then be allocated to business development or place-making or physical improvements. If merchants understand that they are providing an important public service while representing their community, themselves, and each other, then administrators of a market might feel some confidence in the system of self-governance that emerges.

Planners combining regulation with vendor governance should design frameworks that address the various needs merchants have. For instance, merchants are not automatons; they require flexibility and stability in any regulatory regime. Thus, a framework should comprehend the fact that some merchants will be “garage sale guys” and that they should be encouraged to vend, not dissuaded by overly regulated environments. Likewise, planners should also conceive of merchants and markets as “place-makers” and tools for economic development and, thus, should take advantage of the social life and business incubation happening in markets. Accommodating potential merchants permits them to experiment with business before making grander commitments—this invaluable experience is

a step toward entrepreneurship. Economic development professionals recognize the value of such experience and microbusiness programs for encouraging street-level business. Other programs can assist migration to storefront business. Through working with allied professionals or in interdisciplinary planning contexts, planners can ease the vendors' transition to storefront business.

Certainly, there are tensions. For instance, Chaskin (2005) discusses the tension between self-helping grassroots movements and rational bureaucratic comprehensive planning in emerging governance strategies. This article identifies niches for self-governance of some public services and thereby expands the overall ecology of governance, but it does so without making any special claim for self-governance over other methods. However, this emerging ecology of governance strategies indicates to planners that they may have new choices in planning some services. Again, this is not to dispense with regulatory solutions in favor of self-regulation. Instead, perhaps we should see governance modalities as contingent and complementary depending on circumstances.

The planning literature calls for dialogic and participatory approaches to planning and governance. The Market example demonstrates how people might learn and practice new roles and responsibilities, reconstructing themselves and creating a nuanced public service in the process. Nevertheless, even in marketplaces, there are a number of ways that vending space might be allocated according to public purposes. Legal vendors in New York City and illegal vendors in Los Angeles allocate sidewalk space under a first-come, first-served principle. Lotteries and auctions are alternative methods for allocating space. Auctions may be attractive for their potential to raise revenue, but they could be costly to administer. Again, city sociodemographic context matters, as do the goals particular cities have for their markets and merchants (Morales and Kettles 2009a, 2009b).

Opportunities for new governance strategies, in marketplaces and elsewhere, are increasing. A century ago markets mattered for policy purposes, and they are increasingly important again. The federal government now permits markets on federal properties in cooperation with community organizations; this research shows planners options they have in market administration (Morales and Kettles 2009b). Not every market will be suited for vendor governance, but even ethnically heterogeneous populations can establish working marketplace governance. During plan development and review, planners should be aware of how markets might articulate the primary purposes of a plan and how they can choose management tools for a market that enhances the overall plan (Ball 2002; Gerend 2007; Morales 2009a; Morales and Kettles 2009b).

General Implications for Planning Practice and Theory

Planning theorists and practitioners can add self-governance as a policy/program option to achieve some planning objectives.

Doing so will contingently shift the public sector toward being a facilitator instead of the sole provider of services. Self-governance fosters new connections between state and society and within the public by distributing roles and responsibilities. This is not a panacea for public service provision but, rather, another policy tool to consider. This example furthers our understanding of policy tools from one focused on administration and regulation to one envisioning multiple modes of organizing an activity or delivering a service. Furthermore, it captures how interaction will shape service delivery with respect to rules, people, and circumstances. Forty years ago, Rittel and Webber (1973) posited the notion of the "wicked problem" to describe socially and politically complex situations like the Market. Today, new governance strategies, planning objectives, and tools of evaluation permit us to reconceptualize such situations as "wicked opportunities" to embrace the complexity and reconfigure complicated situations by deploying alternative modes of governance and participation.

We should remember that Rittel and Weber were diagnosing problems associated with rational and comprehensive planning. While relevant, their view need no longer dominate our deliberations. The plan is not the only product of planning practice. We have long recognized that planning subdisciplines are practiced in very different ways and planners are employed in a variety of organizations. Rittel and Weber also identified barriers to practice that include inadequate theory, insufficient intelligence, and plural objectives inhibiting the pursuit of unitary aims (1973, 160). Furthermore, they argued that changing circumstances require new solutions to old problems and that only "clarified" problems are amenable to solution. Their famous list of traits needs no repeating; instead, consider how the research I have described and its theory, situation, and findings are open to interpretation as a wicked opportunity.

First of all, pragmatism provides a theoretical peek into the behavioral black box of self-governance—it is more than adequate as a theoretical platform. Second, just as spaces are designed for multiple uses, so too do planning practices have multiple aims. In other words, planners should not fear plural objectives held by the tangled plurality of politics. Instead we should, when possible, identify activities that realize many of the goals of policy makers. Finally, self-governance is responsive to changing circumstances and new participants. We do not need "clarified" problems; rather, we need participants clear about the objectives policy makers have. Noting the services that merchants self-provided, we can see how cash-strapped cities might exploit the interest merchants have in establishing stable and flexible vending spaces and relationships. Not every detail of a merchant's behavior need be regulated. Indeed, a city's capacity to adopt and enforce formal rules is limited by a host of practical considerations. These include budget constraints, political indifference, and the absence of policy consensus. Thus, cities may find it occasionally advantageous to leave rulemaking to those "on the ground" and allow merchants to organize themselves. The stable and flexible conventions that the merchants established in this case

served succeeding waves of merchants. Cities espousing clear goals can expect cooperation and responsiveness from merchants about achieving and revisiting those goals as circumstances change.

Through this case study of vendor governance in a public market, this research reveals how pragmatist methods and planning insight uncover the dynamics of social practices to show planners *how* promoting interaction can work to fulfill their goals (Healey 2009, 284). This research also follows Hoch's (2007) contention that planners focus on empirical claims that influence our practice, acknowledging that there are conditions in which self-governance promotes planning-related goals. From the basis of pragmatist social theory, the empirical claims were developed in light of planning theorists' observations about interaction and its relation to planning goals. Additionally, this research exemplifies how planners can assist in "developing a critical and creative democratic intelligence through governance practices" (Healey 2009, 281). This example of street merchants shows planners how to perceive the organization underlying apparently chaotic situations and enables them to represent this type of "marginal" use.

Conclusion

Most broadly, planners should ask themselves what parts of their plans or programs might be taken up by citizens, not only for the costs savings but for the multitude of positive benefits of governance participation suggested by Jacobs, Frug, Sennett, and others. Besides empowering and capacitating people, diversifying governance strategies empowers planners by providing them new approaches for executing their plans and programs. Planners are well situated to investigate and experiment with various governance approaches because they are at the forefront of problem solving and at the intersection of state and civil society. Planners can advocate for suitably inclusive governance to produce more effective and efficient services, popular places, and "fun" experiences. Indeed, inclusive governance can free planning and allied professionals for other tasks or enable them to seek the productive partnerships between self-provided activities, like markets, and other economic or community development activities in the local context.

Planning academics might follow Fainstein's prescription for inquiries that produce a better world (2005b, 121). Indeed, this inquiry uses theory to frame a discussion of self-governance in creating a better city. In discerning how to plan for the better city, she recommends that practitioners reflect on the historical context, the relationship between economic activity and ethnicity, local governance, and the role policy plays in producing the context. This inquiry echoes these concerns, yet practicing planners need not follow so comprehensive an approach. Planners, allied with professionals, can experiment with mixed governance strategies to discover how to realize a variety of social and professional planning goals, including encouraging public participation, incorporating new immigrant populations, and practicing transactive planning

(Friedmann 1993). What firmer fit with our professional aspirations can we hope for?

Finally, what better way to seek broad public participation than to facilitate it directly in the governance of the very services we plan for? Citizen participation is already common, and seeking to expand it fits with planners' professional interests. Planners are trained to conciliate, identify opportunities, and reconcile stakeholders. They know local contexts and are astute observers of what is, and so they can help orient others to what can be. Agents of the state have much discretion in envisioning new activities—planners should be central to the process of discerning where mixed or self-governance is not only possible, but desirable.

Acknowledgments

Weiping Wu, two anonymous reviewers, and many colleagues have refined the ideas described here, and I am thankful to them all. Elise Gold has been absolutely invaluable as an editor, and I am grateful for her work.

Declaration of Conflicting Interest

The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

1. Farmers markets are doubling every two years according to the USDA. Various types of markets are increasingly important elements of the economic landscape and have inspired a minor industry of print and electronic publications to track their locations. Cities are reviving old and constituting new markets around the country, as found at openair.org and pps.org. Much more research is needed on this subject, including a census of marketplaces (Morales 2009a). Furthermore, the value of these activities is inadequately measured, but can be significant. See, for instance, Morales, Balkin, and Persky (1995) as well as work found at www.openair.org and www.pps.org.
2. Planners' interest in marketplaces is discussed by Ball (2002) and Morales (2009a).
3. Whyte's evidence (1988) refutes the argument that public places would become chaotic if they were too inviting. Instead, he suggests people are self-regulating, and he stresses that city planners and architects avoid strict regulations.
4. Frug contends that local government law has "nurtured one version of the self over alternatives" (1999, 221), organizing cities to equate human freedom with self-advancement. He argues for multiple modes of citizen engagement in place of this dystopian view.
5. Other planning literature proposes alternative and, I would suggest, complementary prescriptions for capacitating people. Sandercock (2003) cites Frug's (1999) premise that fear, especially racial fear, erodes the common good by inhibiting dialog

about common interests. She proposes that planners deploy “therapeutic” processes to transform urban spaces from places of fear to places of coexistence. Instead of creating places or services that promote cooperation, she suggests planners provide services, for example, assisting others in organizing meetings to reconcile distinct interests (2003, 155-59). Clearly her version of the communicative turn is an important approach to promoting desirable urban spaces. However, what role do planners play “when people hatch an idea for improving the city . . . such as a public market”; how might “an authentic-city . . . implement these” (Ellin 2006, 103)?

6. We are not considering festival marketplaces, called “large-scale, government-sponsored private development” (Fainstein 1991, 27-28; see note 4).
7. One could find some straggling street commerce (five to ten vendors of hub caps, tires, sundries, and excellent pork chop sandwiches) at the corner of Halstead and Maxwell, along Maxwell, and along Halstead seven days a week.
8. The concept of social capital could help explain this situation, and I think the idea a good one for another article. Certainly more research on the Market would be helpful, and I am pursuing this work. However, in brief, the contemporary interest in social capital provides one entrée to understanding the outcomes of community conflict by directing our attention to “synergistic” social capital, which turns the bonding (internal to communities) and bridging (between communities or actors) social capital into social and political force capable of engaging municipal governments for accountability and services. This translation of social capital into political capacity creates the potential to achieve community goals. However, this article has a different focus. Accounts of merchants’ inability to organize and reasons for unsuccessful overtures on behalf of the Market are provided by Martel (1996) and Walker (2000).
9. Morales, Balkin, and Persky (1995) discuss seasonal variation in the number of vendors and the economic implications of this variation. While twenty thousand or more customers could be expected on summer Sundays, that number varied with weather, though customers and vendors used umbrellas in the rain. Seasonally customers decreased to a few thousand in the winter, but on special days, like Christmas, Valentine’s, or others, customers increased as vendors provided special offers or trotted out merchandise reserved for those days.
10. Interested readers can learn about how people became vendors in one of my previous articles (Morales 2009a) and about the particular problems for women in another (Morales 2009c).
11. One question the practitioner will ask in the course of this study is this: if the Market was so successful at self-organization, why did the city change how it was organized in 1994? The more complete answer to this question is found in a variety of publications (Walker 2000; Wiewel 1995; Brookstein 2001), but in short, the University of Illinois at Chicago desired the area the Market occupied, as did retail and housing redevelopment interests, and together they demanded the Market’s removal. Merchants and community members argued that the university should embrace this entrepreneurial and social laboratory, but

they lost that battle and the city moved the Market and reorganized it as part of the Department of Consumer Services. In doing so, the city replaced self-organization with bureaucratic organization and so substituted for community-based and citizen-led service (access and allocation of vending space) with bureaucratically produced services. The increased cost of vending reduced the number of vendors, inhibited experimentation with business, and had other negative consequences as discussed by Walker (2000) and me (Morales 2006). Notwithstanding this cheerless but common story of displacement, the merchants did create and sustain the self-produced access and allocation of vending space, and so, for our purposes, the question is how and with what opportunities for planners.

12. This quotation indicates one benefit of state-enforced organization: not having to wake up before 3 a.m. to stake out a spot! However, the point is that vendors were not opposed to rising early and self-creating the organization.
13. That merchant had 325 tables he rented at \$5/table/day, renting on average 3 tables per merchant.
14. The Market represents an example of how shared interests produce sympathy in fellow vendors and then become a source of support in space allocation that complements ethnic identity.
15. Coproduction is another important mode of participation in governance activities (see Morales 2009b).

References

- Arnstein, Sherry R. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 35 (4): 216-24.
- Ball, Jennifer. 2002. Street vending: A survey of ideas and lessons for planners. In *APA Planning Advisory Service 509*. Chicago: APA.
- Berkow, Ira. 1977. *Maxwell Street: Survival in a bazaar*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Brookstein, Mark D. 2001. When history is history: Maxwell Street, “integrity,” and the failure of historic preservation law. *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 76 (3): 1847-85.
- Bovaird, Tony. 2007. Beyond engagement and participation: User coproduction of public services. *Public Administration Review* 67 (5): 846-60.
- Carnoy, Martin. 1984. *The state and political theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Casey, Colleen L. 2009. Linking social capital and indirect policy tools: Fostering equitable community reinvestment responses? *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 28 (4): 413-25.
- Chaskin, Robert J. 2005. Democracy and bureaucracy in a community planning process. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 24 (4): 408-19.
- Cooke, Bill, and Uma Kothari. 2001. The case for participation as tyranny. In *Participation: The new tyranny?* ed. Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, 1-15. London: Zed Books.
- Eastwood, Carolyn. 1991. *Chicago’s Jewish street peddlers*. Chicago, IL: Chicago Jewish Historical Society.
- Eastwood, Carolyn. 2002. *Near west side stories: Struggles for community in Chicago’s Maxwell Street neighborhood*. Chicago, IL: Lake Claremont Press.

- Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. *Order without law: How neighbors settle disputes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ellin, Nan. 2006. *Integral urbanism*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Eshel, Shuli, and Roger Schatz. 2004. *Jewish Maxwell Street stories, voices of America*. Charleston, SC: Arcadia.
- Fainstein, Susan. 1991. Promoting economic development urban planning in the United States and Great Britain. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 57 (1): 22-33.
- Fainstein, Susan S. 2005a. Cities and diversity: Should we want it? Can we plan for it? *Urban Affairs Review* 41 (1): 3-19.
- Fainstein, Susan S. 2005b. Planning theory and the city. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 25 (2): 121-30.
- Feigenbaum, Harvey, and Jeffrey R. Henig. 1994. The political underpinnings of privatization: A typology. *World Politics* 46(1): 185-208.
- Forester, John. 1989. *Planning in the face of power*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Friedmann, John. 1993. Toward a non-Euclidian mode of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 59 (4): 482-85.
- Frug, Gearld E. 1999. *City making: Building communities without building walls*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gaber, John, and Sharon L. Gaber. 1997. Utilizing mixed-method research designs in planning: The case of 14th Street, New York City. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 17 (2): 95-104.
- Gerend, Jennifer. 2007. Temps welcome. *Planning Magazine*, November.
- Hajer, Marriten, and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds. 2003. *Deliberative policy analysis: Understanding governance in the networked society*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2003. *The new imperialism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Healy, Patsy. 1999. Institutional analysis, communicative planning, and shaping places. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 19 (2): 111-21.
- Healy, Patsy. 2009. The pragmatic tradition in planning thought. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 28 (3): 277-92.
- Hillier, Jean. 1998. Beyond confused noise: Ideas toward communicative procedural justice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 18 (1): 14-24.
- Hoch, Charles J. 2007. Pragmatic communicative action theory. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 26 (2): 272-83.
- Jacobs, Jane. 1961. *The death and life of great American cities*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Lobel, Orly. 2007. Rethinking traditional alignments: Privatization and participatory citizenship. In *Progressive lawyering, globalization and markets: Rethinking ideology and strategy*, ed. Clare Dalton, 209-32. New York, NY: William S. Hein & Co.
- Macauley, Stuart. 1963. Non-contractual relations and business: A preliminary study. *American Sociological Review* 28 (1): 55-69.
- Martel, Elise. 1996. From market to market: The reinstitutionalization and legitimation of Chicago's Maxwell Street Market. Master's thesis, University of Illinois, Chicago.
- Mead, George H. 1938. *The philosophy of the act*. Edited by Charles W. Morris. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, George H. 1964. *Selected writings*. Edited by Andrew J. Reck. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, George H. 1977. *George Herbert Mead on social psychology*. Edited by Anselm Strauss. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Morales, Alfonso. 1993. Making money in the market: The social and economic logic of informal markets. Dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
- Morales, Alfonso. 1998. Pragmatism's mundanity: Epistemic foundations for a practicing socio-legal science. Review essay of *Realistic socio-legal theory*, by Brian Tamanaha. *Law and Society Review* 32 (2): 493-514.
- Morales, Alfonso. 2000. Peddling policy: Street vending in historical and contemporary context. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 20 (3/4): 76-98.
- Morales, Alfonso, ed. 2003. *Renascent pragmatism: Studies in law and social science*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate.
- Morales, Alfonso. 2006. *Chicago's Maxwell Street Market: Promise and prospects*. Prepared for the Maxwell Street Foundation, Chicago, IL.
- Morales, Alfonso. 2009a. Public markets as community development tools. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 28 (4):426-40.
- Morales, Alfonso. 2009b. A social currency approach to improving the health related quality of life for migrant workers. *Journal of Southern Rural Sociology* 24 (1): 92-112.
- Morales, Alfonso. 2009c. A woman's place is on the street: Purposes and problems of Mexican American women entrepreneurs. In *Wealth creation and business formation among Mexican-Americans: History, circumstances and prospects*, ed. John S. Butler, Alfonso Morales, and David Torres, 99-125. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
- Morales, Alfonso. Forthcoming. Public markets: Prospects for social, economic, and political development. *Journal of Planning Literature*.
- Morales, Alfonso, Steve Balkin, and Joe Persky. 1995. The value of benefits of a public street market: The case of Maxwell Street. *Economic Development Quarterly* 9(4): 304-320.
- Morales, Alfonso, and Gregg Kettles. 2009a. Healthy food outside: Herein of farmer's markets, taco trucks, and sidewalk fruit vendors. *Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy* 26 (1): 20-48.
- Morales, Alfonso, and Gregg Kettles. 2009b. Zoning for markets and street merchants. *Zoning Practice* 25 (1): 1-8.
- Motley, Willard. 1947. *Knock on any door*. New York, NY: Signet.
- Motley, Willard. 1958. *Let no man write my epitaph*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Ostrom, Elinor, and Krister Andersson. 2008. Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective. *Policy Sciences* 41(1):71 -93.
- Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. 1994. *Rules, games, & common-pool resources*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Pirenne, Henri. 1925. *Medieval cities*. Translated by Frances D. Halsey. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rittel, Horst, and Melvin Webber. 1973. Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. *Policy Sciences* 4:155-69.

- Sager, Tore. 2006. The logic of critical communicative planning: Transaction cost alteration. *Planning Theory* 5 (3): 223-54.
- Sandercock, Leonie. 2003. *Cosmopolis II: Mongrel cities of the 21st century*. London: Continuum.
- Savas, Emanuel S. 1982. *Privatizing the public sector: How to shrink government*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Sennett, Richard. 1971. *The uses of disorder: Personal identity and city life*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Stoker, Gerry. 1998. Governance as theory: Five propositions. *International Social Science Journal* 155:17-28.
- Sullivan, James W. 1913. *Markets for the people: The consumer's part*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Tangires, Helen. 2003. *Public markets and civic culture in nineteenth-century America*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
- Turner, John F. C. 1976. *Housing by people: Towards autonomy in building environments*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Umamoto, Karen, and Krisnawati Suryanata. 2006. Technology, culture, and environmental uncertainty: Considering social contracts in adaptive management. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 25 (2): 264-74.
- Walker, Janelle L. 2000. *Saving Maxwell Street: People, power, and the politics of urban aesthetics in Chicago*. Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington.
- Whyte, William H. 1988. *City: Rediscovering the center*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Wiewel, Wim. 1995. The use of economic analysis in public policy. *Economic Development Quarterly* 9 (4): 324-26.

Bio

Alfonso Morales is an assistant professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He is interested in pragmatism, marketplaces and food systems, and community economic development.