1990 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers
Nature and Value of Autonomy
June 25-August 17, 1990
Directed by Gerald Dworkin, Professor of Philosophy
Guest Speakers
Michael Friedman , Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago
Michael Perry , Northwestern University Law School
Christine Korsgaard , Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago
Mark Siegler , Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago School of Medicine
Sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities, this seminar will explore the concept of autonomy as it has been developed in classic texts, as it has been discussed by contemporary philosophers, and as it has influenced practical moral discussion. The concept of autonomy deserves the same kind of intense critical scrutiny and attention that other concepts such as liberty and equality have received in recent years.
We will examine a number of conceptual questions. How may we best characterize or analyze the notion? How does autonomy differ from various concepts of liberty? Is it possible to be coerced and to act autonomously? What is the relationship of autonomy to concepts of rationality, free-will, and self-determination? If the root idea is one of self-determination, what is the nature of the self which is assumed?
Having argued for some characterization of the concept, the next set of issues will revolve around the possibility of being autonomous. It has seemed to many philosophers that scientific knowledge about the determinants of human behavior renders autonomy an empty notion. What empirical and conceptual arguments can be given for or against the possibility that we can be autonomous? What is the significance of the fact that persons are born into a given environment and culture which they have not shaped themselves?
The next set of issues will be concerned with the normative issues surrounding autonomy. Why is it desirable to be autonomous, to apprehend that others are acting autonomously, and to be respected as an autonomous agent? Is autonomy something that is supremely valuable or is it merely one value which must be balanced against others such as liberty, welfare and equality? What justifications are there for limiting the autonomy of persons? Are there other values such as obligation and loyalty which are essential conflict with autonomy? What is the moral significance of the fact that people will differ in their capacity to act autonomously?
