

RUNNING HEAD: Race and Juvenile Offenders

Race Shapes Perceptions
of Juvenile Offenders in Criminal Court

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Abstract

We investigated effects of defendant race, victim race, and juror gender on non-African American mock jurors' perceptions of crimes committed by juvenile offenders. We predicted that mock jurors, particularly men, would render more pro-prosecution case judgments when the defendant was African American than White. We also predicted that defendants would be judged more harshly when the crime victim was portrayed as White than as African American. Although there were few main effects of defendant race or victim race on case judgments, defendant and victim race by juror gender interactions revealed that men (but not women) demonstrated the predicted bias against African American defendants and victims. Explanations and implications are discussed.

Race Shapes Perceptions of Juvenile Offenders in Criminal Court

At an increasing rate, juvenile offenders who commit serious crimes are being transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court, where their cases will be heard by lay jurors rather than by juvenile court judges (Heilbrun, Leheny, & Huneycutt, 1997). Most states allow the transfer of juveniles as young as 14 years old to adult criminal court. This is despite research demonstrating that compared to adults, youths who are 15 years old and younger perform significantly worse on measures assessing competence to stand trial (Grisso et al., 2003), capacity for decision-making, and susceptibility to coercive influences (Steinberg & Scott, 2003). The current trend of trying juvenile offenders as adults has serious ramifications for young offenders. Juveniles who are transferred to criminal court receive more severe sentences than comparable juveniles tried in juvenile court (Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan, & Moore, 1986) and are even treated more severely than adult offenders who commit similar crimes (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).

How do jurors react to young offenders? There is little research on this issue to date. Some research suggests that the public perceives juveniles to be serious offenders who deserve punishment (Crosby, Britner, Jodl, & Portwood, 1995; Levesque, 1996). Other studies, however, suggest that the public perceives juveniles to be non-serious offenders who are capable of rehabilitation (Haegerich, 2002; Moon, Sundt, Cullen, & Wright, 2000). Thus, public opinion is mixed, but in the courts, juveniles sometimes face harsh treatment. This might be especially true for minority offenders, thus it is particularly important to study juror perceptions of minority juveniles. Compared to Whites, African American juvenile offenders are overrepresented in the juvenile justice system relative to their total population: In 2002, although only 16% of the total U.S. population under age 18 was Black, Black youth comprised 43% of all juvenile arrests – a clear overrepresentation (Snyder, 2004). Even after controlling for offense severity and prior offenses, Black juveniles are more likely than White juveniles to be detained, transferred to criminal court, and given longer sentences (Engen, Steen, & Bridges, 2002; Wordes, Bynun, & Corley, 1994).

In the current study, we conducted a mock trial study to explore the influence of defendant race, victim race, and juror gender on mock jurors' case-related judgments and perceptions in a

criminal trial involving a juvenile defendant tried in adult court. We excluded African American participants from the present study because we are interested in the effects of anti-Black racism against Black defendants, arguably a much more problematic issue in the courts historically than any “reverse discrimination” that might occur (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). We predicted that jurors (particularly men) would render more anti-defendant case judgments (e.g., more guilty verdicts) when a juvenile offender was portrayed as Black than when the juvenile offender was White, and when the victim was White rather than Black. Next, we discuss theories supporting our hypotheses.

Understanding Race and Jurors’ Decisions

What could cause discrepancies in treatment of Black and White juvenile offenders? An important factor is probably the attitudes and stereotypes held by key players in the legal system, from police to jurors. Well-established cultural biases against Blacks rooted in slavery times have translated into well-documented, anti-Black stereotypes that we know today (e.g., Blacks are more violent and aggressive than Whites; Blacks are not as intelligent as Whites) (Devine, 1989). The media likely play a large role in perpetrating negative stereotypes of Black juvenile offenders by selectively emphasizing the violent, predatory nature of Black juvenile offenders, but the innocent, misguided nature of White juvenile offenders. For example, predominately White school shootings perpetrated by White juvenile perpetrators are described as ‘shocking anomalies’ but the same events in predominately Black schools perpetrated by Black juveniles are treated as expected (Breland, 1998). Such disparities in depictions of White and Black juvenile offenders likely perpetuate negative stereotypes toward Black offenders, which, in turn, could contribute to the harsher treatment of Black compared to White juvenile offenders.

It is surprising that there have been no published empirical studies exploring differential perceptions of minority and White juvenile offenders. There are, however, a number of studies exploring perceptions of Black adult offenders. Even though this literature is riddled with mixed findings, Whites generally render more pro-prosecution case judgments for Black than White defendants. For example, Sweeney and Haney (1992) found compelling evidence of racial bias in their meta-analysis exploring effects of defendant race on sentencing in 14 mock juror studies

involving adult defendants (see also Mitchel, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005). Several psychological theories offer ways to explain racial bias in the courtroom, as we discuss next.

Similarity-lenency Hypothesis

One psychological process that might drive discriminatory treatment against Blacks is described by the similarity-lenency hypothesis: Not only do people tend to like similar others more than non-similar others, but people also tend to administer preferential treatment to those they like (Davis, Bray, & Holt, 1977). Accordingly, jurors who perceive themselves as similar to defendants would treat defendants more leniently. Evidence of this was in fact found in a meta-analysis by Mitchel et al. (2005). In the present study, we partially test this hypothesis. That is, we do not examine the judgments of Black jurors when defendants are White because our purpose was to study majority prejudice against Blacks. We do, however, examine White jurors' judgments and feelings of similarity to defendants who are Black versus White.

Racism

Whereas the similarity-lenency bias might in part explain discriminatory treatment against Blacks, a simple theory of racism is also likely to explain discriminatory treatment. Until our country's recent history, overtly racist attitudes and discriminatory treatment were societal norms. Of course, such "old-fashioned racism" could certainly explain anti-Black judgments in certain cases. Most Whites' attitudes toward Blacks today are quite different from those held during the time of the Civil War, or even 50 years ago. Yet lingering negative attitudes and anti-Black stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989) continue to influence behavior and even jurors' decisions in trials. Researchers have identified and labeled several similar "new" forms of subtle racism: modern racism, symbolic racism, and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988). For example, according to the theory of aversive racism, it is no longer socially acceptable to appear outwardly racist (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Aversive racists endorse egalitarian values (which have become societal norms), yet their behavior is still influenced by anti-Black sentiments. Aversive or "old fashioned" racism could explain the finding across a number of studies that Black adult defendants are treated more harshly than White defendants, and that the highest conviction rates occur when the defendant is Black and the victim is White,

whereas the lowest conviction rates occur when the defendant is White and the victim is Black (e.g., Landwehr, Bothwell, Jeanmard, Luque, Brown III, & Breaux, 2002; Pfeifer & Olgoff, 1991; Ugwuegbu, 1979). Yet studies do not always reveal such discriminatory treatment (e.g., Conley, Turnier, & Rose, 2000; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1995; Skolnick & Shaw, 1997). As explained by Sommers and Ellsworth (2001), and consistent with modern racism theory, when race is made salient in mock trial studies, jurors become sensitive to the issue of race, fear that they might appear racist, and therefore compensate for their biased tendencies by showing no preference to a White defendant over a Black defendant. When race is not salient, however, mock jurors convict Black defendants at a higher rate than White defendants. Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) argue convincingly that the majority of the findings in the literature that seem contradictory to predictions of racist behavior are due to experimenters using mock trial scenarios that make race overly salient, which consequently eliminates race effects (see also Sommers & Ellsworth, 2003). In summary, racism can affect jurors' judgments in a trial, particularly when race is not an especially salient component of the trial.

Victim-Choice Plausibility

White jurors render the most pro-prosecution judgments when the victim is White and the defendant is Black as compared to any other victim/defendant race combination (e.g., Lynch & Haney, 2000). These effects of victim race can be explained by theories of racism whereby anti-Black stereotypes and attitudes cause one to devalue Black victims and thus be less concerned with retribution on behalf of a Black victim. Yet Bottoms, Davis, and Epstein (2004) found that in a child sexual abuse case, defendants (Black or White) who were the same race as the victim were assigned a higher degree of guilt than defendants of a race different from the victim. They explained this finding in terms of a theory of victim-choice plausibility: Jurors perceive same-race child sexual abuse as more plausible than cross-race child sexual abuse. In support, Bottoms et al. found that people (correctly) believe same-race child sexual abuse to be more common than different-race child sexual abuse. Jurors might believe this because they know actual statistics, or because they don't think that offenders will desire victims of a different race because of societal taboos about cross-race sexuality. Victim-choice plausibility might also be at stake in a trial

involving a crime such as murder if jurors believe that Black-on-Black and White-on-White crimes are more common than mixed-race crimes. People are probably more likely, however, to find mixed-race robbery/murder crimes more plausible (particularly Black on White crimes) due to the press emphasizing crime perpetrated by Blacks, even though same-race crimes are more common (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). We tested this possibility in the present study by including a measure of the perceived plausibility of crimes involving different races.

Applying Race-Relevant Theories to Cases Involving Juvenile Offenders

The theories we have reviewed should apply to jury decision-making in cases involving juveniles because there is also evidence of racial bias against minority children (e.g., Bottoms et al., 2004). Thus, we predicted that mock jurors would render more pro-prosecution case judgments (e.g., more guilty verdicts, longer sentences) when the juvenile defendant was Black than White and when the victim was White than Black. To date, there have been no published studies of the effects of race on jurors' case decisions and perceptions in cases involving juveniles. Results from research on jurors' perceptions of juveniles generally reveals that perceptions of juvenile offenders vary and are complex in nature. For example, Haegerich (2002) found that laypeople hold two distinct stereotypes pertaining specifically to juvenile defendants: (a) the Superpredator stereotype that juveniles are mature, calculating, and cannot be rehabilitated and (b) the Wayward Youth stereotype that juveniles are immature, do not understand the seriousness of their actions, and can be rehabilitated. Haegerich found that jurors who endorsed the Superpredator stereotype gave more severe case judgments than those who do not endorse this stereotype in a case involving a Black juvenile offender (race was not varied). In contrast, endorsement of the Wayward Youth stereotype led to more lenient case judgments. She also showed that people can be pushed toward endorsing one or the other stereotype through situational trial cues. Given these findings and race-relevant theories previously reviewed, we predicted that people would be more likely to perceive a Black juvenile offender accused of a violent crime as a Superpredator than a White juvenile offender accused of the same crime. Likewise, people would be more likely to perceive a White juvenile offender accused of a violent crime as a Wayward Youth than a Black juvenile offender accused of the same crime. In fact, we expected these beliefs would function as a mediator of the effects of

race on case-related judgments.

We know of only one unpublished study exploring the effects of race on perceptions of a juvenile offender. Reppucci et al. (2004) asked community members to watch a video of a masked juvenile robbing a convenience store at gun-point. Next, participants were shown a picture of the juvenile's face (either Black or White) and asked to render sentence judgments and rate the juvenile's culpability. They found no effects of the juvenile's race. Consistent with Sommers and Ellsworth's (2001) analysis of the literature on jurors' perceptions of adult defendants in light of modern racism theory, we suspect that Reppucci and colleagues' methods (the photo of a Black youth) raised suspicion, increased awareness of race, and consequently, heightened the participants' motivation to avoid racial prejudice. In turn, this could have caused participants to overcompensate for preexisting prejudice and treat the White defendant no differently than the Black defendant. Therefore, we used a manipulation of defendant race that was noticeable to participants, but not overly salient, as described later.

Juror Gender, Race, and Decisions

Finally, we expected that men, to a greater extent than women, would demonstrate the predicted racial biases in judgments. In a previous mock jury study using adult defendants, Dovidio et al. (1997) found what they described as an "unexpected" interaction of juror gender and defendant race such that men (but not women) recommended the death penalty more often when an adult defendant was Black than when he was White. There was even a slight (but non-significant) tendency for women to render more anti-defendant judgments when the defendant was White than when he was Black. Further, compared to women, men, on average, score higher on measures of explicit racism and ethnocentrism (Carter, 1990; Kim, & Goldstein, 2005; for a review, see Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003) and are less likely to confront acts of racial discrimination (Byrnes & Kiger, 2001) and demonstrate acceptance of others (Mills et al., 1995).

One theoretical explanation for gender differences is that social gender norms emphasize nurturance, relationships, interpersonal skills, and consequently, greater acceptance of others for women more than for men (Carter, 1990; Mills et al., 1995). In addition, Carter (1990) suggested that gender differences in racism and acceptance of others might reflect women's heightened

personal experience with sexism and discrimination, as compared to men. Perhaps such experience allows women to have greater empathy with other stigmatized groups. In fact, women are more empathic in general than men (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987). Thus, whereas women might be aware of and even endorse negative stereotypes about African Americans, they might be less likely than men to allow these negative attitudes to manifest in their behaviors because they are more accepting of and empathic toward others. An alternative explanation is that the issue of race might simply be more salient to women than to men because women are generally more likely than men to attend to racial issues (Byrnes & Kiger, 2001). As discussed previously, when race is salient, jurors do *not* render more anti-defendant judgments for a Black than a White defendant (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001; McGowen & King, 1982). But, when race is not salient (as it might not be for men who are less likely than women to attend to racial issues), jurors render more anti-defendant judgments for a Black than a White defendant (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001).

Therefore, we expected interactions involving juror gender and defendant and victim race such that men, but not women, would render more anti-defendant judgments for the Black defendant than for the White defendant and for the White than Black victim.

Overview and Design

Our study conformed to a 2 (race of defendant: Black or White) X 2 (race of victim: Black or White) X 2 (juror gender) between-subjects design. Non-Black mock jurors were presented with a detailed written trial transcript portraying a juvenile defendant accused of robbing and murdering an elderly man (based on the case used by Haegerich, 2002). The race of the defendant and victim were varied, creating four trial conditions. After reading the transcript and Illinois pattern jury instructions, participants individually made a series of case judgments, including verdict, confidence in verdict, recommended sentence, responsibility judgments, and credibility judgments.

Method

Participants

Participants were 94 men and 131 women undergraduates who received credit in Introductory Psychology for participation. An additional 41 participants were dropped: 5 participants who incorrectly recalled the defendant's race on the manipulation check, 13 who

missed victim race, 2 who missed both defendant and victim race, 3 who did not recall the defendant's age, and 18 who were suspicious that the study was about racism.

All participants were jury-eligible U.S. citizens over 18 years old ($M = 19$ years). In terms of socioeconomic status, 12% of the participants' parents earned from \$0 to \$20,000 per annum; 40% earned \$20,000 to \$59,999; 25% earned \$60,000 to \$99,999; and 14% earned over \$100,000. Thirty-six percent were Caucasian, 42% Asian, 16% Latino, and 6% were another ethnicity. We conducted all of the analyses presented herein a second time controlling for participant race (coded as White versus non-Black minority) and found no differences in any of the results.

Materials

Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). We assessed participants' level of racism using the Modern Racism Scale (MRS) during a separate and ostensibly unrelated mass testing session several months prior to the mock trial portion of the study.

Character sheet and trial transcript. The 21-page written trial transcript presents facts of a case involving a 15-year-old male juvenile defendant accused of robbing and murdering an elderly man. This transcript was used successfully in prior research, where it yielded approximately 50% acquittal and 50% conviction rates (Haegerich, 2002). (Evidence should be ambiguous enough to allow for potential stereotypes to affect case judgments.) The transcript was based on two actual criminal cases involving juvenile defendants and was reviewed by an experienced Illinois Assistant States' Attorney for realism. We portrayed the juvenile as a boy because the majority of juvenile violent crime is committed by boy, rather than girl offenders (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). A brief "trial character sheet" precedes the transcript and introduces participants to each trial characters' name, role in the case, age, and race. An example description of a witness is as follows: "Jamal Washington: 15 years old, Male, African American, Defendant who is accused of murdering Adam Jones." Race specified as "African American" or "Caucasian" along with race-consistent names of the defendant (Jamal or Justin) and victim (Roscoe or Adam), constituted the race manipulation. Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) showed that manipulating race in this manner enables participants to recognize race, without making race overly salient.

In the trial transcript, the prosecution argues that the defendant committed the crime to gain

membership into a gang. In contrast, the defense argues that the defendant was unwillingly coerced into being involved in the crime by an older gang leader's use of threat and intimidation, and that it was an older gang leader who shot the victim. The transcript begins with opening statements from the prosecutor and defense attorney, followed by testimony of the prosecution witnesses and then the defense witnesses. There were four different versions of the trial transcript to accommodate the factorial manipulation of defendant and victim race. Specifically, the race mentioned in the trial character sheet changed in each condition, as did the race of the defendant's friends and the race of the victim's friends (to match the defendant's and victim's race, so the facts would seem most plausible). The names of the characters were race-stereotypical (i.e., Roscoe, Hattie, Jamal, Tyree, Lamont, Dante, Shana, and Treva versus Adam, Edith, Justin, Ryan, Jeff, Kyle, Susan, and Katie).

Juror instructions. Jurors received Illinois Pattern Jury instructions that were modified to be easier to understand (past research shows that these instructions, unmodified, are incomprehensible, Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000). Lack of understanding of juror instructions increases effects of racial bias in subsequent case judgments (Lynch & Haney, 2000), so, if anything, giving simplified jury instructions was a more conservative test of the influence of race on case judgments. The instructions informed jurors that they could choose one of three verdicts: (a) not guilty, (b) guilty of aggravated robbery, or (c) guilty of both aggravated robbery and felony murder (the most severe verdict). Jurors were told that if they found the defendant guilty of felony murder, they also must find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery.

Case judgments. The dependent measures included the same verdict choices that would be given in an actual trial with these case facts: Not Guilty or Guilty of Aggravated Robbery, and Not Guilty or Guilty of Felony Murder. We later combined these into a "guilt score" of 0 (*not guilty*), 1 (*guilty of aggravated robbery*), and 2 (*guilty of aggravated robbery and felony murder*). After rendering a verdict for robbery and murder separately, participants were asked how confident they were in each verdict choice on a scale ranging from 0% confident to 100% confident in intervals of 10%. Verdict and confidence in verdict were combined to form a 22-point degree-of-guilt scale for each charge (robbery and murder), ranging from 1 (*not guilty, not at all confident*) to 22 (*guilty, completely confident*). Specifically, "1" represented "*not guilty, 0% confident*," "2" represented

“*not guilty, 10% confident*,” and so on until “11,” which represented “*not guilty, 100% confident*,” “12,” which represented “*guilty, 0% confident*,” and so on until “22,” which represented “*guilty, 100% confident*” (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Participants who voted guilty on one or both charges then chose a sentence preference from a continuous scale of sentence lengths, in increments of 5, ranging from 0 years (*probation only*) to life imprisonment (which was coded as 60, as this was both the highest sentence jurors ever rendered and the equivalent of the typical life span of a person sent to jail at the age of 15 years old).

Mock jurors answered the following questions on 6-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (*No: Not at all*) to 6 (*Yes: Completely*): “Do you blame the defendant, Jamal, for the crime?,” “Do you think that the crime was the defendant’s fault?,” and “Do you believe the defendant was responsible for the crime?.” We created a defendant responsibility scale from these three questions, which was highly reliable for this sample (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .92$). Other measures were (a) “Do you think the defendant should have been tried in adult criminal court or in juvenile court?,” ranging from 1 (*Definitely tried in criminal court*) to 6 (*Definitely tried in juvenile court*), (b) “How believable was Jamal’s (the defendant’s) testimony?,” ranging from 1 (*Totally Not Believable*) to 6 (*Totally Believable*), (c) “How much did you question the evidence that was presented to convince you of the defendant’s guilt?,” ranging from 1 (*Did not at all question the strength of the evidence*) to 6 (*Totally questioned the strength of the evidence*), and (d) “How much were you afraid of convicting a defendant who may have been innocent?,” ranging from 1 (*Did not at all fear convicting an innocent defendant*) to 6 (*Extremely feared convicting an innocent defendant*).

Similarity scales. To test the similarity-leniency hypothesis, we included a 2-item Defendant Similarity Scale and a 2-item Victim Similarity Scale, which were modified from measures used in a study by Haegerich and Bottoms (2000). These items, answered on 7-point scales, ranging from -3 (*Strongly Disagree*) to $+3$ (*Strongly Agree*), included “I feel similar to Jamal Washington, the defendant,” “I feel similar to Roscoe Jones, the victim,” “I think I have a lot of things in common with Jamal Washington, the defendant,” and “I think I have a lot of things in common with Roscoe Jones, the victim,” respectively.

Victim-choice plausibility measures. As did Bottoms et al. (2001), we assessed perceived

plausibility of same-race and different-race crime by asking, “Think about all of the juvenile crimes like the one you just read that *actually occur* in the U.S. Rate the percentage of these *actual real-life* crimes (from 0% to 100%) that you think involve a: (a) Black perpetrator and a Black victim, (b) Black perpetrator and a White victim, (c) White perpetrator and a White victim, and (d) White perpetrator and a Black victim.”

Manipulation and suspicion checks. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to state the race of the defendant and victim. They were also asked to state the age of the defendant, because this was a key issue in this study. To determine whether participants were suspicious of our hypotheses, participants were asked, “As you were completing this study, what did you think the study was about? Explain.”

Juvenile Offender Stereotype Scale. Participants completed a shortened version of the Juvenile Offender Stereotype Scale (JOSS) developed by Haegerich (2002) to assess the degree to which participants endorse stereotypes that juvenile offenders are Superpredators or Wayward Youths. This questionnaire was changed to refer to the specific juvenile offender in the present case (Justin or Jamal). The scale consists of a series of statements measuring perceptions of the defendant’s decision-making abilities, comprehension of the law, morality, pattern of criminal activity, and rehabilitation potential (e.g., “Jamal is a cold and calculating superpredator,” and “Jamal probably is not able to understand the court process”). Participants rated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from -3 (*Totally Disagree*) to $+3$ (*Totally Agree*). Our shortened scale had acceptable internal reliability ($\alpha = .80$, M inter-item correlation = $.22$).

Demographics. We assessed participants’ gender, age, U.S. citizenship, race, and socioeconomic status (SES) information.

Procedure

After obtaining informed consent, we randomly assigned participants to one of the four race conditions and asked them to read the appropriate character sheet thoroughly. To ensure that participants remembered the race of the defendant and victim, but did not become suspicious that the study was about racism, participants were given the following instructions for reading the trial

character sheet: “Because this case includes many characters and because it is *very* important that you do not confuse or forget the names of the characters, please spend the next 5 minutes reading the trial character sheet very carefully. One thing that might help you remember the people in this case is to try to create a mental image of each character in your head. This might also make the trial more life-like for you.” Pilot testing ensured that these instructions were effective in helping participants to remember race without becoming suspicious about racism. After participants read the trial character sheet they were told that they could begin reading the trial transcript, but that they should keep the trial character sheet handy and refer to it while reading the trial. Then participants read the trial transcript and the jury instructions. Next, in order, they completed the case judgments and JOSS, the similarity measures, the suspicion check question, the race manipulation check questions, the victim-choice plausibility questions, and the demographics questionnaire. After all measures were completed, the participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and given course credit. All procedures and materials were approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board.

Results

We conducted a series of 2 (defendant race: Black or White) X 2 (victim race: Black or White) X 2 (juror gender) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) testing the main hypotheses regarding the effects of defendant race, victim race, and juror gender on case judgments (i.e., guilt, sentence, defendant responsibility, the belief that the defendant should have been tried in adult versus juvenile court, the believability of the defendant’s testimony, the degree to which participants feared convicting a defendant who may have been innocent, the degree to which jurors questioned whether the evidence was strong enough to convince them of the defendant’s guilt), defendant similarity, victim similarity, and the Juvenile Offender Stereotype Scale. Because men participants ($M = 9.98$, $SD = 5.26$) scored higher on the MRS than did women ($M = 8.11$, $SD = 5.20$), $t(222) = 2.63$, $p < .01$, we recomputed all analyses controlling for juror racism, but we found only two differences in the results, which we will reported in the results below. The number of participants ranged from $N = 23$ to $N = 34$ for each of the eight defendant race by victim race by juror gender conditions. We also conducted separate analyses examining (a) the possible mediation of

defendant race and victim race effects by the JOSS, Defendant Similarity, and Victim Similarity; and (b) plausibility ratings for same-race versus different-race crimes.

Guilt Judgments

Nineteen percent of participants voted not guilty of either robbery or murder, 35% voted guilty of robbery but not guilty of murder, and 46% voted guilty of murder. (Of the 46% who voted guilty of murder, four voted not guilty of robbery but guilty of murder – a verdict that is non-compliant with the jury instructions. Because the law allows jurors to nullify the law and render verdicts inconsistent with jury instructions, we included these participants in analyses.) We analyzed dichotomous guilt judgments separately for robbery and for murder with binary logistic regression analyses, entering defendant race, victim race, juror gender, and all interaction terms into the equation. There were no significant main effects of defendant race (Wald = .24, *ns*; Wald = 2.74, *ns*), victim race (Wald = .00, *ns*; Wald = .43, *ns*), juror gender (Wald = .00, *ns*; Wald = .75, *ns*), respectively, nor were there any significant interactions (all Walds \leq 1.75, *ns*). (See Table 1 for all means.) The overall model was not significant for either robbery verdict or murder verdict, all $LR \chi^2(7, N = 225) < 10.27, ns$.

Next, we conducted three separate 2 (defendant race: Black or White) X 2 (victim race: Black or White) X 2 (juror gender) ANOVAs on guilt score (the 3-point verdict scale), degree-of-guilt for robbery, and degree-of-guilt for murder, which are each more sensitive measures than the dichotomous guilt judgments. Contrary to hypotheses, there were no significant main effects, all $F_s < 1.22, ns$ (see Table 1 for means), but several interactions reached statistical significance. First, for guilt score, there was a significant victim race by juror gender interaction, $F(1, 217) = 5.32, p < .05$ (see Figure 1). Simple effects analyses revealed a marginally significant tendency for men (but not women) to render harsher verdicts when the victim was White ($M = 1.44$) than when the victim was Black ($M = 1.13$), $F(1, 92) = 3.83, p < .10$. In contrast, women's verdicts did not differ significantly as a function of victim race, $F(1, 129) = 1.77, ns$. Second, there was a marginally significant defendant race by juror gender interaction on guilt score, $F(1, 217) = 3.42, p < .10$. The pattern of means reveals a cross-over interaction such that men rendered harsher verdicts when the defendant was Black ($M = 1.37$) than White ($M = 1.19$), $F(1, 92) = 1.08, ns$, but women rendered

harsher verdicts when the defendant was White ($M = 1.38$) than Black ($M = 1.16$), $F(1, 129) = 2.67$, *ns*. Even so, these effects were not statistically reliable, all $F_s \leq 2.84$, *ns*, and the differences are quite small. Also note that the marginally significant defendant race by juror gender interaction for guilt score became not significant when controlling for the MRS. Third, there was a significant victim race by juror gender interaction for degree-of-guilt for robbery, $F(1, 217) = 5.59$, $p < .05$. Similar to the pattern for guilt score, depicted in Figure 1, men, but not women, showed the predicted bias against Black victims. Specifically, men rendered harsher verdicts for robbery when the victim was White ($M = 18.00$) than when the victim was Black ($M = 15.66$), $F(1, 92) = 4.60$, $p < .05$. In contrast, women's verdicts for robbery did not differ as a function of victim race, $F(1, 129) = 1.16$, *ns*. The defendant race by juror gender interaction for this variable did not reach significance, $F(1, 217) = .03$, *ns*.

Fourth, for degree-of-guilt for murder, the juror gender by victim race interaction did not reach significance, $F(1, 216) = .33$, *ns*, but the defendant race by juror gender interaction did, $F(1, 216) = 5.20$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 2). Simple effects analyses on this interaction did not reach statistical significance, but the pattern of means reveals a crossover trend with men, but not women, showing the predicted racial bias: Men rendered somewhat harsher verdicts for murder when the defendant was Black ($M = 14.35$) than when the defendant was White ($M = 12.24$), $F(1, 91) = 2.23$, *ns*. Women rendered somewhat harsher verdicts for murder when the defendant was White ($M = 13.16$) than when the defendant was Black ($M = 11.42$), $F(1, 128) = 3.01$, $p < .10$.

Sentence Recommendations

ANOVAs revealed no significant main effects nor interactions of defendant race, victim race, nor juror gender on sentences for either robbery or murder, all $F_s < 2.72$, *ns* (see Table 1), with one exception: For murder sentences, there was a significant defendant race by juror gender interaction, $F(1, 97) = 5.10$, $p < .05$. Similar to the pattern for murder degree of guilt depicted in Figure 2, simple effects revealed a marginally significant effect such that women, but not men, rendered longer sentences for the Black defendant ($M = 27.40$) than for the White defendant ($M = 19.56$), $F(1, 57) = 3.12$, $p < .10$. (Note that there were fewer participants for these analyses, $N = 74$ for robbery and $N = 105$ for murder, because only those who voted guilty gave sentence

recommendations.)

Responsibility and Credibility Judgments

ANOVAs revealed no significant main effects or interactions of the independent variables on defendant responsibility judgments, all $F_s < .85$, ns , nor on defendant credibility judgments, all $F_s < 2.20$ (see Table 1).

Belief that Defendant Should Have Been Tried in Adult Criminal Court or in Juvenile Court

Women believed the defendant should have been tried in juvenile court ($M = 3.31$) more than did men ($M = 2.74$), $F(1, 217) = 6.62$, $p < .05$. There were no other significant main effects or interactions (all $F_s < .81$, ns).

Fear of Convicting an Innocent Defendant

Analysis of jurors' fear of convicting an innocent defendant revealed no significant main effects of defendant race, $F(1, 217) = .33$, ns (see Table 1). There was, however, a significant main effect of victim race such that people feared convicting an innocent defendant more when the victim was White ($M = 4.52$) than when the victim was Black ($M = 4.22$) $F(1, 217) = 3.98$, $p = .05$. Note, however, that the significant victim race effect for fear of convicting an innocent defendant became not significant when controlling for the MRS. There was also a significant main effect of juror gender such that women ($M = 4.54$) feared convicting an innocent defendant more than men did ($M = 4.13$), $F(1, 217) = 4.79$, $p < .05$. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of victim race by juror gender, $F(1, 217) = 4.44$, $p < .05$. Simple effects analyses revealed that men (but not women) feared convicting an innocent defendant more when the victim was White ($M = 4.50$) than when the victim was Black ($M = 3.77$), $F(1, 92) = 6.05$, $p < .05$. In contrast, women were not affected by victim race, $F(1, 129) = .01$, ns .

Questioning the Strength of the Evidence

Surprisingly, jurors questioned the strength of the evidence more when the defendant was Black ($M = 4.31$) than when the defendant was White ($M = 3.86$), $F(1, 217) = 5.76$, $p < .05$. Also, women questioned the evidence ($M = 4.24$) more than did men ($M = 3.87$), $F(1, 217) = 4.22$, $p < .05$. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all $F_s < .85$, all ns (see Table 1).

Juvenile Offender Stereotype Scale

Contrary to our predictions, there were no significant effects of the independent variables on JOSS scores, all $F_s < 1.03$, ns (see Table 1). Because we hypothesized that the JOSS would mediate effects of defendant race on case-related judgments, we conducted mediational analyses, but only for male participants, for whom defendant race significantly predicted degree-of-guilt for murder. The first step in such analyses is to show that defendant race predicted JOSS responses, yet it did not ($\beta = .00$, ns), $R^2 = .00$, $F(1, 92) = .00$, ns , therefore we conducted no further steps in the mediational analytic strategy.

Similarity-Leniency

Two separate ANOVAs found that men ($M = 2.22$) felt marginally more similar to the defendant overall than did women ($M = 1.86$), $F(1, 217) = 3.71$, $p < .10$ (see Table 1), which might reflect a gender similarity-leniency effect. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all $F_s < 1.08$, ns . We hypothesized that defendant and victim similarity would mediate effects of defendant race and victim race on case judgments, respectively. Because (as reported above) defendant and victim race predicted guilt score, degree-of-guilt for robbery, and degree-of-guilt for murder for men only, we conducted mediational analyses using only men. These regression analyses revealed no effect of defendant race ($\beta = .08$, ns) on defendant similarity and no effect of victim race ($\beta = .04$, ns) on victim similarity, all $R^2_s < .01$, $F_s < .58$, ns . Thus, we conducted no further steps in testing mediation.¹

Victim-Choice Plausibility

We found no evidence that same-race crime was perceived as more plausible than different-race crime, the possibility of which motivated our measurement of victim choice plausibility. Even so, we analyzed this variable with a within-subjects ANOVA, with each of the 4 different defendant/victim race combinations as levels of the within-subjects factor. The analysis reached significance, $F(3, 645) = 26.57$, $p < .001$, and follow-up analyses revealed two significant effects and two marginally significant effects. Specifically, participants believed that Black juveniles assaulting a Black victim (30.03%, $SD = 15.15$) occurred more than White juveniles assaulting White victims (20.68%, $SD = 11.24$), $F(1, 218) = 21.19$, $p < .001$, and that Black on White juvenile crime (32.31%, $SD = 16.33$) occurred more than White on Black juvenile crime

(17.96%, $SD = 11.28$), $F(1, 218) = 59.81$, $p < .001$. In addition, participants believed that Black on White juvenile crime (32.31%, $SD = 16.33$) occurred more than Black on Black crime (30.05%, $SD = 15.15$), $F(1, 218) = 3.35$, $p < .10$, and that Black on White crime (32.31%, $SD = 16.33$) occurred more than White on White crime (20.68%, $SD = 11.24$), $F(1, 218) = 3.73$, $p < .10$.²

Discussion

For the first time, we examined the influence of a juvenile defendant's race, a victim's race, and juror gender on judgments about a juvenile defendant tried in criminal court. Drawing upon theories of racism and anti-Black stereotypes, we predicted that jurors (particularly men) would render more anti-defendant case judgments for a Black defendant than a White defendant and more pro-defendant case judgments when the victim was Black than when the victim was White. Further, we predicted that these effects would be explained by the psychological constructs of juvenile offender stereotypes, feelings of defendant and victim similarity, and the belief that same-race crime is more plausible than different-race crime. Men (but not women) jurors did demonstrate racial bias in some case judgments, including the most legally important judgments of guilt. These effects, however, were not found across all measures and were not mediated by the constructs of juvenile offender stereotypes, similarity/leniency, or victim-choice plausibility. We also found that our participants believed that Black on White crimes were the most plausible, and White on Black crimes were least plausible – an inaccurate, and therefore perhaps racist belief, because same-race crime is actually far more likely than different-race crime (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Next, we discuss the implications of our data.

Gender and Racial Bias

Men, but not women, rendered racially biased guilt judgments, which are arguably the most important variables in the study. Specifically, in terms of guilt score and degree-of-guilt for robbery, men rendered more guilty case judgments when the victim was White than when the victim was Black. In addition, men (but not women) assigned a higher degree of guilt for murder when the defendant was Black than when he was White, an effect that also approached significance for the guilt score variable. These effects did not manifest for the remaining case judgments, yet close examination reveals that the means for defendant responsibility and

credibility ratings and the belief that the defendant should have been tried in adult criminal court are also in the hypothesized direction for men, but not for women. Thus, men made racially biased judgments, as we predicted based on theories of racism. This provides evidence that White male jurors can be biased against Black juvenile offenders.

Our findings are consistent with Dovidio and colleagues' (1997) research exploring effects of juror gender and defendant race on death penalty recommendations. They found that men, but not women, were more likely to recommend a death sentence for Black adult defendants than White defendants. Our results are also consistent with research showing that that men, on average, tend to score higher on measures of explicit racism than do women (Carter, 1990; Kim & Goldstein, 2005; for a review, see Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003). In fact, our men participants scored higher on the Modern Racism Scale (MRS) than did women, yet even after controlling for these racial attitude differences, all of the significant interactions involving gender and victim and defendant race still held, with the exception of the interaction between defendant race and guilt score. Thus, gender differences in the MRS probably play a very small role, if any, in explaining gender differences in racial bias toward juvenile offenders. What other psychological constructs might account for the gender differences? The fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of sexism and gender discrimination might lead women to have greater empathy toward other victims of any discrimination, and in turn, less likely than men to express racial discrimination (Carter, 1990).

One might argue that because women are more sensitive to issues of race and racism (Byrnes & Kiger, 2001; Mills et al., 1994), race might simply have been more salient to women than to men in our study. When race is salient, jurors do *not* render more anti-defendant judgments for a Black than a White defendant (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), and in some instances, jurors even favor Black over White defendants (e.g., McGowen & King, 1982). But, when race is not salient, jurors *do* render more anti-defendant judgments for a Black than a White defendant (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). This is because most people are motivated to appear non-prejudiced and will make a conscious effort to behave in a non-prejudiced way when race issues are salient, but when is not clear that certain behaviors are racist or discriminatory, preexisting

racial biases and prejudices will manifest (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986). But this explanation for our results is unlikely. Proportionately equal men (7%, $N = 8$) and women (7%, $N = 10$) were dropped from the study before analyses because they mentioned something about race in response to the question, “As you were completing this study, what did you think the study was about? Explain.” Thus, race was not more salient for women than for men, and all participants who suspected the study had anything to do with race were dropped. In fact, we dropped more participants (9%) for *missing defendant or victim race* on a manipulation check than for *suspecting* that we were studying race (7%). That is, race was not even salient enough for 9% of the original sample to be able to remember defendant or victim race. Thus, in Sommers and Ellsworth’s (2001) words, our methodology “enables participants to recognize race without making race overly salient.”

Note, though, that suspicion about racism does not equate to worrying about *appearing* racist. That is, women might simply be more concerned about appearing racist than men generally (Byrnes & Kiger, 2001; Mills et al., 1994). To the extent that women worry about controlling their prejudiced reactions, they might overcompensate for their prejudice and allocate even less severe judgments for the Black than for the White defendant – which was a non-significant trend for some case judgments in this study such as degree-of-guilt for murder. Future research should investigate psychological constructs that explain gender differences in racial bias.

Another significant finding worth mentioning is that several main effects of juror gender suggest that women are more sympathetic overall to the plight of the juvenile offender. Specifically, women were more likely than men to think the juvenile should have been tried in juvenile court and to question the strength of the evidence in the case. These findings are in line with a well-established finding that women are more likely than men to empathize with children and render pro-prosecution judgments in sexual and physical abuse cases (for a review, see Bottoms, Golding, Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007; Kean & Dukes, 1991).

Unexpected Effects

A few unexpected effects (and the lack of expected effects) deserve explanation. The defendant race by juror gender interaction was significant for guilt score and degree-of-guilt for

murder, but not for degree-of-guilt for robbery. This might be because the murder verdict is a more consequential, and therefore more difficult decision than the robbery verdict. Racial bias is most likely to manifest when decision-making is difficult (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Thus, jurors' racial bias toward the Black juvenile might be more likely to manifest when the verdict outcome is more severe (i.e., difficult). This explanation, however, is somewhat undermined by the finding that race (in the form of victim race) affected men jurors' judgments for degree-of-guilt for robbery but not judgments of degree-of-guilt for murder.

It was also unexpected that women (not men) rendered more severe sentences for murder for the Black defendant than the White defendant. We are hesitant to attach much meaning to this finding because only a special sub-set of the participants (i.e., those who voted guilty of murder) answered the sentencing question. Women who voted guilty of murder might be different from other women in the sample, explaining why, for this one variable only, women rendered more anti-defendant judgments for the Black than the White defendant. Weiten and Diamond (1979) point out that sentence is a poor defendant variable in mock jury research, because jurors are typically not permitted to allocate sentences.

We were also surprised by the lack of pervasive effects of race across all measures, which was not due to a lack of power, which was .83 to find a medium effect size given our sample size, number of groups, and an alpha value of .05. Aversive racism theory suggests that racial bias is most likely to manifest when decision-making guidelines are ambiguous. In support, Bottoms, Davis, and Epstein (2004) found that participants were biased against minority victims of child sexual abuse, but this effect manifested in judgments of responsibility (a more subtle or ambiguous measure) and not for verdicts (a more proscribed judgment). In contrast, racial bias in our study emerged from men for the most important and non-ambiguous measures: guilt judgments. Racial bias did not emerge for the more subtle or ambiguous judgments of defendant responsibility, credibility, and the Juvenile Offender Stereotype Scale, although means were in the predicted direction for defendant responsibility and credibility and the belief that the defendant should have been tried in adult criminal court. Thus, our results do demonstrate evidence for racial bias: Men made more anti-defendant judgments for a Black than for a White juvenile, even though they

perceive the Black and White juvenile as nearly equally responsible and credible and as no different in terms of whether or not he is perceived as a Superpredator or a Wayward Youth.

A methodological issue that might have contributed to the lack of race effects across all our case judgments deserves mention. Our crime was gang-related robbery and murder. Participants might perceive gang-related crime as normal or natural when it is committed by a Black juvenile, but abnormal when committed by a White juvenile. That is, a White juvenile (but not a Black juvenile) accused of a gang-related crime might seem particularly predatory (more like a Superpredator) because it is unexpected. Recall Breland's (1998) finding that the media depict school shootings in White districts with White juvenile offenders as "shocking abnormalities," but as "expected" in Black districts with Black juvenile offenders. Had we used another type of crime, more pervasive racial differences might have emerged.

Finally, the unexpected finding that men feared convicting an innocent defendant more when the *victim* was White than Black deserves comment. This result seems counter to theories of racial bias and inconsistent with the tendency for men in this study to be biased against Blacks. One might argue that men feared convicting an innocent defendant more when the victim was White than Black simply because men jurors *actually convicted* the defendant more when the victim was White than Black. To test this, we controlled for actual verdict (i.e., guilt score) in analyses of fear of convicting an innocent defendant, but the victim race effect remained significant, defeating this explanation. Another possible explanation is that participants simply evaluated the case with more concern or simply took the case more seriously when a White victim was involved than when a Black victim was involved. That is, the case might have seemed more important to men jurors when the victim was White than Black (an effect of racial bias).

Caveats

No mock jury study can duplicate the experience of actual jurors in a courtroom.. For example, participants in this study also rendered case judgments individually rather than deliberating in a group. It is unclear whether deliberation will maximize, minimize, or not affect the expression of individual jurors' biases (Haegerich, 2002). Also, our participants were college students, as in many mock juror studies (e.g., Bottoms et al., 2004; Golding, Allen, Yozwiak,

Marsil, & Kinsfle, 2004; Tang & Nunez, 2003). Although a meta-analysis of various types of mock jury studies has revealed few differences between college students' and community members' case judgments (Bornstein, 1999), Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) suggest that there might be important differences when exploring effects of race. Specifically, they suggest that on a college campus, where diversity and equal rights are typically emphasized as normative values, racism is likely to be particularly salient and, arguably, more aversive to undergraduates than to community members, who might not be as regularly exposed to such liberal values. In fact, our university is among the top ten most racially diverse in the nation (U.S. News and World Report, 2006). Thus, the undergraduate participants in this experiment may have been particularly motivated to control for or to correct their racial biases when giving case-related judgments for a Black juvenile defendant and for a Black victim. In support, our entire sample indicated being more concerned about the strength of the evidence presented to convince them of guilt when the defendant was Black than when the defendant was White. So, our study may have been a particularly conservative test of the hypotheses, which makes our findings of some race effects even more interesting. Effects of racial bias might be even more pervasive in a community sample, as was the case in a study by Sommers and Ellsworth (2001). In fact, a study by ForsterLee, ForsterLee, Horowitz, and King (2006) found that both men and women (but especially women) Australian community members rendered more punitive case judgments when the defendant was Aboriginal Black than White.

Future research should replicate our study using more ecologically valid measures, but our research is still an important and instructive first step because there are no other studies exploring effects of race on mock jurors' perceptions of juvenile defendants tried in adult court. Also, some of our methods did approximate the actual courtroom experience. For example, we employed a lengthy and detailed transcript based on actual Illinois cases, as opposed to short fabricated vignettes sometimes used in mock jury studies. In addition, we used the actual jury instructions used for such charges in Illinois, although we did modify them to make them more understandable to participants, as research has shown that jurors rarely understand jury instructions (e.g., Lynch & Haney, 2000). We also made certain that all participants were 18-years-old or older and U.S.

citizens, as actual jurors must be. Finally, during experimental sessions, we went to great lengths to emphasize the importance of this research, and we believe participants took their role as jurors seriously.

Conclusion

Our study serves an important role in examining biases against a vulnerable group of offenders – juvenile offenders – many of whom have already been victims themselves of abuse as children (for a review, see Malinosky-Rummell & Hansen, 1993). Due to current societal trends toward treating this vulnerable group of young offenders severely within the legal system, it is increasingly important to examine biases against them. It is particularly important to examine biases against African American juvenile offenders, due to an overwhelming body of research demonstrating biases against them at various stages of juvenile justice processing. To ignore predictors of bias toward juvenile offenders risks undermining a core foundation of the legal system: a fair and impartial trial for all citizens.

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Footnotes

¹Although we did not include Black participants in our study and therefore could not fully test the similarity-leniency hypothesis, our sample included both Whites of European origin and non-Black minorities. To explore the possibility that there might be a similarity-leniency bias defined by minority/non-minority status, we conducted two separate analyses, a 2 (juror race: non-Black minority or White) X 2 (defendant race: Black or White) ANOVA on defendant similarity ratings and a 2 (juror race: non-Black minority or White) X 2 (victim race: Black or White) ANOVA on victim similarity ratings. There was no significant interaction of juror and defendant race for defendant similarity ratings, $F(1,221) = 1.09$, *ns*, nor was there a significant interaction of juror and victim race for victim similarity ratings, $F(1, 221) = .06$, *ns*. Specifically, minority participants perceived Black ($M = 1.72$, $SD = 1.02$) and White defendants ($M = 1.97$, $SD = 1.65$) similarly and White participants perceived Black ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 1.44$) and White defendants ($M = 2.03$, $SD = 1.35$) similarly. In addition, minority participants perceived Black ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.85$) and White victims ($M = 2.46$, $SD = 1.42$) similarly, and White participants perceived Black ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.54$) and White victims ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.62$) similarly.

²To explore the possibility that condition (defendant and victim race) might influence participants' estimates of same-race versus different-race crime, we conducted a series of 2 (defendant race: Black or White) X 2 (victim race: Black or White) ANOVAs separately for estimates of Black on Black crime, White on White crime, White on Black crime, and Black on White crime. The only significant main effect was that of victim race on participants' estimates of White on Black crime. Participants in the Black victim condition estimated significantly greater White on Black crime ($M = 19.27$, $SD = 9.70$) than did participants in the White victim condition ($M = 15.46$, $SD = 9.43$), $F(1, 197) = 7.89$, $p < .05$. We therefore conducted the within-subjects ANOVA of estimates of same-race versus different-race crime again, controlling for victim race condition. There were no differences in results.

Table 1
Percentage Voting Guilty and Mean Case Judgments as a Function of Defendant Race, Victim Race, and Juror Gender

	Black Victim			White Victim			Marginal Mean
	Women	Men	Marginal Mean	Women	Men	Marginal Mean	
Verdict for Robbery							
<i>(% guilty)</i>							
Black Defendant	82.4%	69.6%	77.2%	75.8%	83.3%	78.9%	78.1%
White Defendant	87.1%	66.7%	78.2%	75.8%	91.3%	82.1%	80.2%
Verdict for Murder							
<i>(% guilty)</i>							
Black Defendant	38.2%	52.2%	43.9%	36.4%	62.5%	47.4%	45.6%
White Defendant	64.5%	37.5%	52.7%	42.4%	43.5%	42.9%	47.7%
Guilt Score^{bf}							
Black Defendant	1.21 (.73)	1.22 (.90)	1.21 (.80)	1.12 (.78)	1.52 (.73)	1.29 (.78)	1.25 (.78)
White Defendant	1.52 (.68)	1.04 (.86)	1.31 (.79)	1.24 (.75)	1.35 (.65)	1.29 (.71)	1.30 (.75)
Degree of Guilt:							
Robbery^b							
Black Defendant	17.06 (4.92)	15.74 (5.77)	16.52 (5.27)	16.36 (5.37)	17.70 (5.10)	16.91 (5.26)	16.75 (5.24)
White Defendant	17.68 (4.46)	15.58 (6.59)	16.76 (5.54)	16.45 (5.37)	18.22 (3.72)	17.18 (4.80)	16.97 (5.16)
Degree of Guilt:							
Murder^a							
Black Defendant	11.65 (5.44)	14.00 (5.95)	12.60 (5.72)	11.18 (5.97)	14.70 (5.95)	12.63 (6.16)	12.54 (5.93)
White Defendant	14.13 (5.81)	12.30 (6.64)	13.35 (6.19)	12.24 (5.73)	12.17 (6.18)	12.21 (5.87)	12.77 (6.03)
Sentence for Robbery							
Black Defendant	4.20 (4.43)	3.75 (2.50)	4.11 (4.04)	5.00 (4.40)	1.25 (2.50)	4.12 (4.49)	4.00 (4.48)
White Defendant	4.38 (5.63)	5.83 (4.92)	5.00 (5.19)	5.39 (6.28)	7.27 (6.17)	6.25 (6.17)	5.79 (5.79)
Sentence for Murder^a							
Black Defendant	23.08 (17.02)	18.75 (11.10)	21.00 (14.36)	32.08 (23.88)	24.23 (20.62)	27.72 (22.05)	24.49 (18.88)
White Defendant	19.75 (12.30)	31.67 (16.96)	23.45 (14.71)	19.29 (15.30)	25.50 (14.61)	21.88 (15.03)	22.74 (14.73)
Defendant Responsibility Scale							
Black Defendant	3.45 (1.19)	3.55 (1.57)	3.49 (1.34)	3.71 (1.19)	3.97 (1.51)	3.82 (1.33)	3.67 (1.34)
White Defendant	3.69 (1.10)	3.72 (1.64)	3.70 (1.35)	3.52 (1.30)	3.87 (1.09)	3.67 (1.22)	3.68 (1.28)
Defendant Credibility							
Black Defendant	3.35 (1.10)	3.39 (1.37)	3.37 (1.20)	3.67 (1.27)	3.30 (1.33)	3.52 (1.29)	3.46 (1.25)
White Defendant	3.56 (.92)	3.71 (1.12)	3.51 (1.12)	3.64 (1.14)	3.39 (.99)	3.54 (1.08)	3.52 (1.04)

Where Defendant Should be Tried ^c							
Black Defendant	3.24 (1.39)	2.43 (1.75)	2.91 (1.58)	3.48 (1.46)	2.87 (1.69)	3.23 (1.57)	3.08 (1.58)
White Defendant	3.23 (1.36)	2.83 (1.79)	3.05 (1.56)	3.27 (1.65)	2.83 (1.75)	3.09 (1.69)	3.07 (1.62)
Fear Convicting Innocent Defendant ^{cbe}							
Black Defendant	4.62 (1.46)	3.70 (1.40)	4.25 (1.49)	4.55 (1.12)	4.26 (1.51)	4.43 (1.29)	4.43 (1.39)
White Defendant	4.48 (1.18)	3.83 (1.83)	4.20 (1.52)	4.52 (1.25)	4.74 (1.05)	4.61 (1.17)	4.41 (1.36)
Question Evidence ^{ce}							
Black Defendant	4.53 (1.35)	3.91 (1.56)	4.28 (1.46)	4.52 (1.06)	4.09 (1.56)	4.34 (1.30)	4.32 (1.37)
White Defendant	4.13 (1.20)	3.71 (1.33)	3.95 (1.27)	3.79 (1.08)	3.78 (1.24)	3.79 (1.14)	3.86 (1.20)
Juvenile Offender Stereotype Scale							
Black Defendant	3.67 (.61)	3.77 (.58)	3.71 (.60)	3.56 (.73)	3.57 (.90)	3.56 (.80)	3.63 (.70)
White Defendant	3.81 (.59)	3.65 (.83)	3.74 (.70)	3.81 (.90)	3.67 (.63)	3.75 (.81)	3.75 (.75)
Defendant Similarity Scale							
Black Defendant	2.03 (1.27)	2.37 (1.42)	2.17 (1.33)	1.86 (1.24)	1.76 (1.34)	1.86 (1.29)	2.01 (1.31)
White Defendant	1.79 (1.62)	2.35 (1.30)	2.04 (1.50)	1.76 (1.27)	2.30 (1.59)	1.98 (1.42)	2.01 (1.45)
Victim Similarity Scale							
Black Defendant	2.96 (1.78)	2.48 (1.19)	2.76 (1.58)	2.47 (1.48)	2.39 (1.53)	2.46 (1.49)	2.61 (1.53)
White Defendant	2.53 (1.93)	2.67 (1.46)	2.59 (1.73)	2.50 (1.77)	2.91 (1.35)	2.67 (1.61)	2.63 (1.66)

Note. Standard deviations are noted parenthetically. ^aSignificant Defendant Race X Gender interaction, $p < .05$.

^bSignificant Victim Race X Gender interaction, $p < .05$. ^cSignificant effect of Gender, $p \leq .05$. ^dSignificant main effect of Victim Race, $p = .05$. ^eSignificant main effect of Defendant Race, $p = .02$. ^fMarginally significant Defendant Race X Gender interaction, $p < .10$.

Figure 1. Victim race by juror gender interaction for guilt score.




Figure 2. Defendant race by juror gender interaction for degree-of-guilt for murder.

